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Executive Summary 275 
The Lancet Countdown: Tracking Progress on Health and Climate Change was established to 276 
provide an independent, global monitoring system dedicated to tracking the health 277 
dimensions of the impacts of, and the response to climate change. It tracks 41 indicators 278 
across five domains: climate change impacts, exposures, and vulnerability; adaptation 279 
planning and resilience for health; mitigation actions and health co-benefits; economics and 280 
finance; and public and political engagement.  281 
 282 
This report is the product of a collaboration of 27 leading academic institutions, and United 283 
Nations and intergovernmental agencies from every continent. It draws on world-class 284 
expertise from climate scientists, ecologists, mathematicians, geographers, engineers, 285 
energy, food, livestock and transport experts, economists, social and political scientists, 286 
public health professionals, and doctors. 287 
 288 
The Lancet Countdown’s work builds on decades of research in this field, and was first 289 
proposed in the 2015 Lancet Commission, which documented the human impacts of climate 290 
change and proposed ten global recommendations to respond to this public health 291 
emergency and secure the public health benefits available (panel 1).1 292 
 293 
These four key messages derive from the Lancet Countdown’s 2018 report, with key 294 
findings summarised below. 295 
 296 
 Present day changes in labour capacity, vector-borne disease, and food security 297 
provide early warning of compounded and overwhelming impacts expected if 298 
temperature continues to rise. Trends in climate change impacts, exposures, and 299 
vulnerabilities demonstrate an unacceptably high level of risk for the current and 300 
future health of populations across the world. 301 
 A lack of progress in reducing emissions and building adaptive capacity threatens 302 
both human lives and the viability of the national health systems they depend on, 303 
with the potential to disrupt core public health infrastructure and overwhelm health 304 
services. 305 
 Despite these delays, trends in a number of sectors see the  beginning of a low-306 
carbon transition, and it is clear that the nature and scale of the response to climate 307 
change will be the determining factor in shaping the health of nations for centuries 308 
to come. 309 
 Ensuring a widespread understanding of climate change as a central public health 310 
issue will be vital in delivering an accelerated response, with the health profession 311 
beginning to rise to this challenge. 312 
 313 
 314 
 315 
 316 
 317 
 318 
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Climate change impacts, exposures, and vulnerability 319 
Vulnerability to extremes of heat has steadily risen since 1990 in every region, with 157 320 
million more people exposed to heatwave events in 2017 compared with 2000 and the 321 
average person experiencing an additional 1.4 days of heatwaves per year over the same 322 
period (Indicators 1.1 and 1.3). For national economies and household budgets, 153 billion 323 
hours of labour were lost in 2017 due to heat, an increase of more than 62 billion hours (3.2 324 
billion weeks of work) since 2000 (Indicator 1.4). The direct effects of climate change extend 325 
beyond heat to include extremes of weather. In 2017, a total of 712 extreme weather 326 
events resulted in $326 billion in economic losses in 2017, almost triple the total losses 327 
experienced the year before (Indicator 4.1). 328 
 329 
Small changes in temperature and precipitation can result in large changes in the suitability 330 
for transmission of important vector- and water-borne diseases. In 2016, global vectorial 331 
capacity for the transmission of dengue fever was the highest on record, rising to 9.1% and 332 
11.1% above the 1950s baseline for Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus, respectively. 333 
Focusing on high-risk areas and diseases, the Baltic has observed a 24% increase in the area 334 
of coastline suitable for epidemics of Vibrio Cholera; and the highlands of Sub-Saharan 335 
Africa have experienced a 27.6% rise in the vectorial capacity for the transmission of 336 
malaria, from a 1950 baseline through to 2016 (Indicator 1.8). A proxy of agricultural yield 337 
potential shows declines in every region, with 30 countries currently experiencing 338 
downward trends in yields, reversing a decades-long trend of improvement (Indicator 1.9.1). 339 
 340 
Falling labour productivity, increased capacity for the transmission of diseases such as 341 
dengue fever, malaria, and cholera, and threats to food security provide early warning of 342 
compounding negative health and nutrition impacts if temperatures continue to rise. 343 
 344 
 345 
 346 
Adaptation, planning, and resilience for health 347 
Global inertia in adapting to climate change persists, with a mixed response from national 348 
governments since the signing of the Paris Agreement in 2015. Over half of global cities 349 
surveyed expect climate change to seriously compromise public health infrastructure, either 350 
directly, with extremes of weather disrupting critical services, or indirectly, by 351 
overwhelming existing services with increased burdens of disease (Indicator 2.2). 352 
 353 
Globally, committed spending for climate change adaptation remains well below the $100 354 
billion USD per year committed to under the Paris Agreement. Within this, only 3.8% of total 355 
development spending committed through formal UNFCCC mechanisms is dedicated to 356 
human health (Indicator 2.8). This lack of investment in adaptive capacity is magnified in 357 
specific regions around the world, with only 55% of African countries meeting International 358 
Health Regulation core requirements for preparedness for a multi-hazard public health 359 
emergency (Indicator 2.3). 360 
 361 
 362 
 363 
 364 
 365 
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Mitigation actions and health co-benefits 366 
Multiple examples of stagnated mitigation efforts exist, with a crucial marker of 367 
decarbonisation – the carbon intensity of total primary energy supply – remaining 368 
unchanged since 1990 (Indicator 3.1). One third of humanity, 2.8 billion people, live without 369 
access to healthy, clean, and sustainable cooking fuel or technologies, the same level seen 370 
in 2000 (Indicator 3.4). In the transport sector, per capita global road transport fuel use 371 
increased by 2% from 2013 to 2015, while cycling comprises less than 10% of total journeys 372 
taken in three quarters of a global sample of cities (Indicators 3.6 and 3.7).  373 
 374 
The health burden of such inaction has been immense, with people in over 90% of cities 375 
breathing polluted air toxic to their cardiovascular and respiratory health. Indeed, between 376 
2010 and 2016, air pollution concentrations worsened in almost 70% of cities around the 377 
globe, particularly in low- and middle-income countries (Indicator 3.5.1). In 2015 alone, 378 
some fine particulate matter (PM2.5) was responsible for some 2.9 million premature 379 
deaths, with coal comprising over 460,000 (16%) of these, with the total toll (including other 380 
particulates, and emissions such as NOx substantially higher (Indicator 3.5.2). Of concern, 381 
global employment in fossil fuel extractive industries actually increased by 8% between 382 
2016 and 2017, reversing a strong decline seen since 2011 (Indicator 4.4).  At a time when 383 
national health budgets and health services face a growing epidemic of lifestyle diseases, 384 
continued delay in unlocking the potential health co-benefits of climate change mitigation is 385 
short-sighted and damaging for human health. 386 
 387 
Despite this stagnation, progress in the power generation and transport sectors provide 388 
some cause for optimism, with many positive trends observed in the 2017 report continuing 389 
in the 2018 report. Notably, coal use continues to decline (Indicator 3.2) and more 390 
renewable energy was installed in 2017 than energy from fossil fuels (Indicator 3.3). 391 
However, maintaining global average temperature rise to well below 2°C necessitates wide-392 
reaching transformations across all sectors of society – power generation, transport, spatial 393 
infrastructure, food and agriculture, and the design of health systems. These 394 
transformations, in turn, offer levers to help tackle the root causes of the world’s greatest 395 
public health challenges. 396 
 397 
 398 
 399 
Finance and economics 400 
Some 712 climate-related extreme events were responsible for 326 billion USD of losses in 401 
2017, almost triple that of 2016 (Indicator 4.1). Crucially, 99% of the losses in low-income 402 
countries remained uninsured.  403 
 404 
Indicators of investment in the low-carbon economy demonstrate that the transition is 405 
already underway, with continued growth in investment in zero-carbon energy, and growing 406 
numbers of people employed in renewable energy sectors (Indicators 4.2 and 4.4). 407 
Furthermore, investment in new coal capacity in 2017 was its lowest in at least 10 years, 408 
with 2015 potentially marking a peak in coal investment. Correspondingly, global subsidies 409 
for fossil fuels continued to fall, whilst carbon pricing currently only covers 13.1% of global 410 
greenhouse gas emissions, this number is expected to increase to over 20% when planned 411 
legislation in China is implemented in late-2018 (Indicator 4.6 and 4.7). 412 
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 413 
However, the rise of employment in fossil fuel industries in 2017 reversed a five-year 414 
downward trend, and will be a key indicator to follow closely. 415 
 416 
Public and political engagement 417 
A better understanding of the health dimensions of climate change allows for advanced 418 
preparedness, increased resilience and adaptation, and a prioritisation of mitigation 419 
interventions that protect and promote human wellbeing. 420 
 421 
To this end, coverage of health and climate change in the media has increased substantially 422 
between 2007 and 2017 (Indicator 5.1). Following this trend, the number of academic 423 
journal articles published on these links has almost tripled over the same time period 424 
(Indicator 5.2). These figures often follow internationally significant events such as the 425 
UNFCCC’s Conference of the Parties, along with temporary rises in mentions of health and 426 
climate change within the UN General Debate (Indicator 5.3). The extended heat waves 427 
across the northern hemisphere in the summer of 2018 may prove to be a turning point in 428 
public awareness of the seriousness of climate change.  429 
 430 
2017 saw a dramatic rise in the number of medical and health professional associations 431 
actively responding to climate change. In the US, a new alliance of medical associations on 432 
health and climate change represents 500,000 physicians. This follows the formation of the 433 
UK Health Alliance on Climate Change, which brings together many of the UK’s Royal 434 
Medical and Nursing Colleges and major health institutions. Organisations like the European 435 
Renal Association–European Dialysis and Transplant Association, and the UK’s National 436 
Health Service are committing to reduce the contributions of their clinical practice 437 
emissions. The NHS achieved an 11% reduction in emissions between 2007 and 2015. A 438 
number of health organisations have divested, or are committing to divest their holdings in 439 
fossil fuel companies, including the Royal Australasian College of Physicians, the Canadian 440 
Medical Association, the American Public Health Association, and the World Medical 441 
Association (Indicator 4.5). 442 
 443 
As the biggest global health threat of the 21st century, responding to climate change, and 444 
ensuring this delivers the health benefits available, is the responsibility of the health 445 
profession – indeed, such a transformation will not be possible without it. 446 
 447 
 448 
 449 
Progress on the recommendations of the 2015 Lancet Commission 450 
The 2015 Lancet Commission made ten global recommendations to accelerate the response 451 
to climate change and deliver the health benefits this could offer. Panel 1 presents a 452 
summary of the progress made against these recommendations using the 2018 Lancet 453 
Countdown’s indicators. Here, global leadership is being provided by China, the European 454 
Union, and many of the countries most vulnerable to climate change.  455 
 456 
Panel 1. Progress towards the recommendations of the 2015 Lancet Commission on 
Health and Climate Change 
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In 2015, the Lancet Commission made ten policy recommendations. Of these, the Lancet 
Countdown is measuring progress on the following recommendations. 
 
Recommendation 1: invest in climate change and public health research 
Since 2007, published articles on health and climate change in scientific journals has 
increased by 182% (Indicator 5.2). 
 
Recommendation 2: scale-up financing for climate-resilient health systems 
Spending on direct health adaptation as a proportion of total adaptation spend increased 
in 2017 to 4.8% (£11.68 billion), representing an increase in absolute and relative terms 
from the previous year (Indicator 2.7). Health-related adaptation spending (including 
disaster response, and food and agriculture) was estimated at 15.2% of total adaptation 
spend. Whilst this national-level spending is increasing, climate financing for mitigation 
and adaptation remains well-below the $100 billion per year committed to in the Paris 
Agreement (Indicator 2.8). 
 
Recommendation 3: phase-out coal-fired power 
Coal consumption remains high, but continued to decline in 2017, a trend which is largely 
driven by China’s decreased reliance, and continued investment in renewable energy 
(Indicators 3.2 and 3.3). The “Powering Past Coal Alliance” – an alliance of 23 countries 
including the UK, Italy, Canada, and France – was launched at COP23 (December 2017), 
committing to phase-out coal use by 2030 or earlier. 
 
Recommendation 4: encourage a city-level low-carbon transition to reduce urban 
pollution 
In 2017, a new milestone was reached, with over 2 million electric vehicles now on the 
road, and global per capita electricity consumption for road transport increasing by 13% 
from 2013 to 2015 (Indicator 3.6). Here, China is responsible for more than 40% of electric 
cars sold globally. 
 
Recommendation 5: establish the framework for a strong and predictable carbon 
pricing mechanism 
Whilst a global carbon pricing mechanism has seen limited progress, the proportion of total 
greenhouse gas emissions covered by national and regional instruments is increasing from 
a low base. In 2017, 13.1% of greenhouse gas emissions were covered, a number that is 
expected to increase to 20% in 2018 with the implementation of the Chinese national 
Emissions Trading Scheme (Indicator 4.9).  
 
Recommendation 6: rapidly expand access to renewable energy, unlocking the 
substantial economic gains available from this transition 
Globally, 157 GW of renewable energy was installed in 2017, over twice as much as that 
installed 70 GW of fossil fuel capacity (Indicator 3.3), advancing mitigation efforts and 
improving local air quality. This trend was mirrored by a 5.7% increase in the number of 
people currently employed in renewable energy in 2017, reaching 10.3 million jobs 
(Indicator 4.4). From 2000 to 2016, the number of people without connection to 
electricity fell from 1.7 billion to 1.1 billion (Indicator 3.4). 
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Recommendation 9: Agree and implement an international treaty that facilitates the 
transition to a low-carbon economy 
In response to the United States’ announcement of its intention to withdraw from the 
Paris Agreement, the great majority of countries provided statements of support, re-
affirming their commitment to hold global average temperature rise to well below 2°C. 
Nicaragua and Syria have both since signed the Paris Agreement. The UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change requested the development of a formal report to be 
delivered at COP24, designed to provide recommendations on how public health can 
more comprehensively engage with the negotiation process.  
 
Recommendation 10: Develop a new, independent collaboration to provide expertise in 
implementing policies that mitigate climate change and promote public health, and 
monitor progress over the next 15 years 
The Lancet Countdown is a growing collaboration of 27 partners, committed to an 
iterative and open process of tracking the links between public health and climate 
change. In 2018, the Wellcome Trust announced its intention to continue funding the 
collaboration’s work, supporting ongoing monitoring across its five domains, up to 2030. 
 
 457 
 458 
  459 
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Introduction 460 
A rapidly changing climate has dire implications for every aspect of human life, exposing 461 
vulnerable populations to extremes of weather, altering patterns of infectious disease, and 462 
compromising food security, safe drinking water, and clean air (figure 1).2 These impacts 463 
work to exacerbate transnational and intergenerational inequality, compromising many of 464 
the national and global public health imperatives that doctors, nurses, and allied health 465 
professionals have dedicated their lives to. The health, economic, and social implications of 466 
climate change provide justification-enough for the rapid acceleration of mitigation and 467 
adaptation efforts, and it is clear that successfully achieving the United Nations (UN) 468 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) is dependent on a robust response to climate 469 
change. 470 
 471 
At the broadest level, maintaining global average temperature rise to well below 2°C 472 
necessitates: a complete de-carbonisation of power generation away from fossil fuels, 473 
reversing a trend that began with the industrial revolution; a reorientation towards 474 
sustainable global food and agricultural systems; a re-thinking of the structure and function 475 
of spatial infrastructure and cities, and methods of transport within and between them; the 476 
safeguarding of other planetary boundaries and the reversal of deforestation and land-use 477 
change trends; and profound changes in the methods of delivery of healthcare.3-6 These 478 
wide-reaching interventions dovetail with numerous public health priorities, providing 479 
opportunities to improve breathing conditions for the 90% of the global population exposed 480 
to polluted air; tackle the root causes of obesity, physical inactivity, and poor diet; alleviate 481 
social inequalities and promote social inclusion; improve workplace environments; and 482 
increase access to healthcare and other social services.1 483 
 484 
Taken as a whole, the form and pace of the world’s response to climate change will shape 485 
the health of nations for centuries to come. 486 
 487 
The Lancet Countdown: Tracking Progress on Health and Climate Change is an international, 488 
politically-independent collaboration that exists to monitor this global transition from threat 489 
to opportunity. The partnership brings together 27 leading academic institutions, and UN 490 
and intergovernmental agencies from every continent, with expertise from climate 491 
scientists, ecologists, mathematicians, geographers, engineers, energy, food, livestock and 492 
transport experts, economists, social and political scientists, public health professionals, and 493 
doctors. 494 
 495 
Its 2018 report tracks 41 indicators of impact and progress across five domains: climate 496 
change impacts, exposures, and vulnerability; adaptation planning and resilience for health; 497 
mitigation actions and their health co-benefits; economics and finance; and public and 498 
political engagement (table 1). 499 
 500 
 501 
 502 
 503 
 504 
 505 
 506 
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Working Group Indicator 
Climate Change Impacts, Exposures 
and Vulnerability 
1.1: Vulnerability to the heat-related risks of climate change 
1.2: Health effects of temperature change 
1.3: Health effects of heatwaves 
1.4: Change in labour capacity 
1.5: Health effects of extremes of precipitation (flood and drought) 
1.6: Lethality of weather-related disasters 
1.7: Global health trends in climate-sensitive diseases 
1.8: Climate-sensitive infectious diseases 
1.9: Food security and 
under-nutrition 
1.9.1:  Terrestrial food security and 
under-nutrition 
1.9.2: Marine food security and under-
nutrition 
1.10: Migration and population displacement 
Adaptation, Planning, and 
Resilience for Health 
2.1: National adaptation plans for health 
2.2: City-level climate change risk assessments 
2.3: Detection, preparedness and response to health emergencies 
2.4: Climate change adaptation to vulnerabilities from mosquito-
borne diseases 
2.5: Climate information services for health 
2.6: National assessments of climate change impacts, vulnerability, 
and adaptation for health 
2.7: Spending on adaptation for health and health-related activities 
2.8: Health adaptation funding from global climate financing 
mechanisms 
Mitigation Actions and Health Co-
Benefits 
3.1: Carbon intensity of the energy system 
3.2: Coal phase-out 
3.3: Zero-carbon emission electricity 
3.4: Access to clean energy 
3.5: Exposure to ambient 
air pollution 
3.5.1: Exposure to air pollution in cities 
3.5.2: Premature mortality from ambient 
air pollution by sector 
3.6: Clean fuel use for transport 
3.7: Sustainable travel infrastructure and uptake 
3.8: Ruminant meat for human consumption 
3.9: Healthcare sector emissions 
Finance and Economics 
4.1: Economic losses due to climate-related extreme events 
4.2: Investments in zero-carbon energy and energy efficiency 
4.3: Investment in new coal capacity 
4.4: Employment in renewable and fossil fuel energy industries 
4.5: Funds divested from fossil fuels 
4.6: Fossil fuel subsidies 
4.7: Coverage and strength of carbon pricing 
4.8: Use of carbon pricing revenues 
Public and Political Engagement 
5.1: Media coverage of health and climate change 
5.2: Coverage of health and climate change in scientific journals 
5.3: Engagement in health and climate change in the United Nations 
General Assembly 
5.4: Engagement in health and climate change in the corporate 
sector 
 507 
Table 1. The 2018 Lancet Countdown indicators. 508 
 509 
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A global monitoring system for health and climate change 510 
Monitoring and tracking has long been an essential tool in the public health professional’s 511 
arsenal, important in understanding and diagnosing the problem in question, predicting its 512 
future impact, identifying vulnerable populations, developing and prioritising responses, 513 
and evaluating interventions. 514 
 515 
A ‘good’ indicator must be based on a credible link between public health and climate 516 
change, it must be sensitive to changes in the climate, and less sensitive to non-climate 517 
explanations, data must be available and reproducible across temporal and geographical 518 
scales, and it must provide actionable information to guide policy in a timely manner.7 The 519 
Lancet Countdown has adopted an iterative and open approach to the development of 520 
indicators of the links between climate change and public health. Its 2016 report launched a 521 
global consultation, seeking input on what can and should be tracked, with a final set of 522 
indicators presented in its 2017 report. These were based on the above criteria and the 523 
collaboration’s time and resource constraints.8,9  524 
 525 
This 2018 report provides an additional year of data and presents the results of 12 months 526 
of work further developing and improving the methods and data sources for each indicator. 527 
These improvements include: 528 
- New methodologies for indicators capturing: changes in labour capacity; future 529 
projections of dengue fever (an important climate-sensitive disease); terrestrial and 530 
marine food security; climate information provided to health services; the quality 531 
and comprehensiveness of health adaptation plans; and global access to clean 532 
energy. 533 
- Expanded geographical and temporal coverage for indicators capturing: mortality 534 
from air pollution (PM2.5) by sector; active transport uptake; employment in low-535 
carbon industries; and engagement from governments, the scientific community, 536 
and the media, in health and climate change. 537 
- New indicators of: vulnerability to extremes of heat; exposure to flood; exposure to 538 
drought; transmission suitability for malaria and pathogenic Vibrio; adaptive capacity 539 
to vector-borne disease; and corporate sector engagement in health and climate 540 
change. 541 
- Proposals for future indicators looking to capture: the mental health effects of 542 
climate change; and the preparedness of healthcare infrastructure. 543 
  544 
Every year until 2030, these indicators will be developed and improved, taking into account 545 
new methodologies, data sources, and resources as they become available. To this end, the 546 
collaboration continuously invites input from experts and academic institutions willing to 547 
support the further development of analysis presented here.  548 
 549 
Health and climate change in 2017 550 
This report presents 41 indicators of progress in health and climate change, with global- and 551 
regional-level results and analysis for each indicator. Detailed methodological descriptions, 552 
data sources, and discussion are included in the Appendices, which have been developed as 553 
an essential companion to the main report. 554 
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 555 
In 2017, a number of concerning trends continued, with vulnerable populations 556 
experiencing 157 million heatwave exposure events, and 153 billion hours of labour lost due 557 
to rising temperatures, representing increases from baseline levels (Indicator 1.3 and 558 
Indicator 1.4). Vectorial capacity for the transmission of dengue fever continued to rise, with 559 
2016 being the most suitable year for transmission from Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus 560 
since the 1950 baseline studied. The carbon intensity of Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) 561 
remained static at 55-57 tCO2/TJ (where it has been since 1990), and 2.8 billion people still 562 
lived without access to healthy, clean, and sustainable cooking fuels and technologies 563 
(Indicator 3.1 and Indicator 3.4). 564 
 565 
However, there are clear signs of progress both within, and beyond the health profession’s 566 
response to climate change. Health systems’ adaptive capacity remained robust, and the 567 
World Health Organization’s (WHO) newly elected Director General listed health adaptation 568 
as among the agency’s top priorities. TPES from coal-fired power continued to decline, with 569 
more than 20 countries (including the UK, Canada, Mexico, and France) committing to 570 
unilateral coal phase-out (Indicator 3.2). Renewable energy continued to grow rapidly, with 571 
157 Gigawatt (GW) of new capacity installed (up from 143 GW in 2016), compared to 70 GW 572 
of fossil fuel capacity (Indicator 3.3). Health institutions, including the American Public 573 
Health Association, Medibank Australia, and the Hospitals Contribution Fund of Australia, 574 
announced their commitment to divest from fossil fuels, with funds totalling 33.6 billion 575 
USD (Indicator 4.5). The United States’ announcement of its intention to withdraw from the 576 
Paris Agreement contrasted with the formation of a new alliance of US medical associations 577 
(including the American Medical Association, the American College of Physicians, and the 578 
American Academy of Paediatrics) representing 500,000 clinicians, dedicated to tackling 579 
climate change.10 580 
 581 
The data presented in the Lancet Countdown’s 2018 report provides ongoing reason for 582 
cautious optimism, with the continuation of important trends signalling the beginning of a 583 
broader transition. Despite this, substantially faster progress is required across the full 584 
range of indicators over the coming five years in order to meet the commitments made 585 
under the Paris Agreement.  586 
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Section 1: Climate Change Impacts, Exposures and Vulnerability 587 
 588 
Introduction 589 
This first section provides insights into the impact of anthropogenic climate change on 590 
human health, tracking along the many pathways elucidated in figure 1. These indicators 591 
follow numerous mechanisms and causal pathways, looking to describe underlying 592 
population vulnerabilities, human exposures, and ultimately, the health impacts that result 593 
from a changing climate. This narrative approach, built around quantitative indicators, 594 
allows the explicit exploration of the extent to which climate change is compromising public 595 
health globally. 596 
 597 
 598 
Figure 1. The pathways between climatic changes through to health impacts. (Source: Watts 599 
et al, 2015).1 600 
 601 
The methods, data sources, and indicators selected for this year’s Lancet Countdown report 602 
have been significantly improved. A number of new indicators have been developed, 603 
including metrics on vulnerability to heat exposure (Indicator 1.1); exposure to flood and 604 
drought (Indicator 1.5); and the climatic suitability for transmission of malaria and 605 
pathogenic Vibrio species (Indicator 1.8). Methodologies and data sources have also been 606 
updated and improved, with more sophisticated analysis conducted on labour capacity loss 607 
due to rising temperatures (Indicator 1.4); and the health implications of declining marine 608 
and terrestrial primary food productivity (Indicator 1.9). 609 
 610 
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Indicator 1.1: Vulnerability to the heat-related risks of climate change 611 
Headline finding: Rising ambient temperatures place vulnerable populations at increased 612 
risks across all WHO regions. Populations in Europe and the East Mediterranean are 613 
particularly at-risk, with 42% and 43% of their populations over 65 years of age vulnerable to 614 
heat exposure. 615 
 616 
Increasing temperatures as a result of climate change will continue to expose vulnerable 617 
populations to additional heat-related morbidity and mortality, including heat stress, 618 
cardiovascular disease, and renal disease.2 Adults over 65 years are particularly vulnerable, 619 
as are individuals with underlying cardiovascular diseases, diabetes, and chronic respiratory 620 
diseases, and those living in urban areas.11-13 These exact factors are used, with equal 621 
weighting, to develop an index of vulnerability to current and future heat-exposure as a 622 
result of climate change. 623 
 624 
In all regions of the world, the proportion of populations vulnerable to heat exposure is 625 
rising. Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean demonstrate markedly higher vulnerability as 626 
compared to Africa and South East Asia, a finding that is most likely the result of a more 627 
elderly population living in urban areas. In addition, demographic transitions in low- and 628 
middle-income countries (LMICs) show accelerating trends in non-communicable diseases, 629 
especially in South East Asia, where vulnerability has increased by 3.5% since 1990 (see 630 
Appendix 2 for figure and further details). 631 
 632 
This heat vulnerability index was compiled using data from the Global Burden of Disease 633 
(GBD) for trends in disease prevalence, and the Inter-Sectoral Impact Model 634 
Intercomparison Project (ISIMIP), for GDP, population densities and demographics.14,15 Full 635 
details of the methods, data sources and figures for this new indicator can be found in 636 
Appendix 2. 637 
 638 
 639 
Indicator 1.2: Health effects of temperature change 640 
Headline finding: Mean global summer temperature change experienced by humans is more 641 
than double the global average change, rising 0.8°C versus 0.3°C, respectively. 642 
 643 
The rising vulnerability identified in Indicator 1.1 is mirrored by greater human exposures to 644 
higher temperatures. In 2017, the mean temperature increase relative to the 1986-2005 645 
reference period, was 0.3°C, with human exposure more than double at 0.8°C (figure 2). This 646 
continues an accelerating trend globally, which was identified in the Lancet Countdown’s 647 
previous report.9 648 
 649 
The methods and data sources for this indicator remain unchanged, and are described in full 650 
in the 2017 Lancet Countdown report and in Appendix 2, with data sourced from the 651 
European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF).9 16 652 
 653 
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 654 
Figure 2. Mean summer warming relative to the 1986-2005 average. 655 
 656 
 657 
Indicator 1.3: Health effects of heatwaves 658 
Headline finding: In 2017, an additional 157 million heatwave exposure events occurred 659 
globally, representing an increase of 18 million additional exposure events compared with 660 
2016. 661 
 662 
The strong upward trend observed in the 2017 Lancet Countdown report, with notable 663 
peaks in heatwave exposure observed in 2010 and 2015, continues in this 2018 report. On 664 
average, each individual experienced an additional 1.4 days of heatwave in 2017 since 2000 665 
(as compared to the 1986-2005 baseline). Furthermore, in 2017, an additional 157 million 666 
exposure events occurred (one ‘exposure event’ being one heatwave, experienced by one 667 
person), 18 million more than in 2016 (figure 3). This continues to directly risk the health of 668 
those exposed populations, but also indirectly (for instance, food insecurity resulting from 669 
livestock exposure to heatwaves). 670 
 671 
The methods and data sources (ECMWF) for this indicator are described in the 2017 Lancet 672 
Countdown report and in Appendix 2.9,16 673 
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 674 
Figure 3. Change in heatwaves exposure events (with one exposure event being one 675 
heatwave experienced by one person) compared with the recent past (1986-2005 average). 676 
 677 
 678 
Indicator 1.4: Change in labour capacity 679 
Headline finding: In 2017, 153 billion hours of labour (3.4 billion weeks of work) were lost; 680 
an increase of 62 billion hours lost relative to 2000. 681 
 682 
Rising temperatures are a key risk for occupational health, with temperatures regularly 683 
breaching physiological limits, making sustained work increasingly difficult or impossible.17 684 
This indicator highlights the disproportionate impact of climate change and its labour 685 
capacity effects on vulnerable populations, with significantly improved methods deployed as 686 
described by Kjellstrom et. al.17 This method assigns work fraction loss functions to different 687 
activity sectors in accordance to the power typically expended by a worker performing that 688 
activity; labour loss is calculated as a function of the Wet Bulb Globe Temperature (WBGT). 689 
Total global hours of labour loss are calculated by factoring in the working population 690 
distribution and distribution of activities across sectors in different countries. Labour is 691 
divided into three sectors: service (metabolic rate of 200W), industry (300W), and 692 
agriculture (400W), all assumed to be working in the shade. As with Indicators 1.2 and 1.3, 693 
weather data was obtained from ECMWF; details of the method and datasets used can be 694 
found in the Appendix 2.16 695 
 696 
In total, 153 billion hours of labour were lost in 2017, an increase of 62 billion hours relative 697 
to the year 2000; notably, 80% of these losses were in the agricultural sector (see Appendix 698 
2 for figure and further details). The areas most affected by these changes are concentrated 699 
in already vulnerable areas in India, South East Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa (figure 4). 700 
 701 
 702 
 703 
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 704 
 705 
Figure 4. Map showing the mean change in total hours of labour lost at the 400W activity 706 
level over the 2000-2017 period relative to the 1986-2005 baseline. This activity level 707 
corresponds to manual labour in agriculture. 708 
 709 
 710 
Indicator 1.5: Health effects of extremes of precipitation (flood and drought) 711 
Headline finding: Changes in extremes of precipitation exhibit clear regional trends, with 712 
South America and South East Asia among the regions most exposed to flood and drought. 713 
 714 
This new indicator maps extremes of precipitation globally and is divided into two 715 
components; drought and extreme rainfall. The change in the mean number of severe 716 
droughts has been mapped for 2016 (figure provided in Appendix 2). This highlights 717 
increased exposures in large areas of South America, Northern and Southern Africa, and 718 
South East Asia, with significant areas experiencing a full 12 months of drought throughout 719 
the year. Prolonged drought remains one of the most dangerous environmental 720 
determinants of premature mortality, resulting in reduced crop yields, food insecurity, and 721 
malnutrition (which in turn, leads to life-long stunting, wasting and eventually death when 722 
experienced by young children).2 The spread of water-borne disease, reduced availability of 723 
potable water, and migration as a result of reductions in arable and habitable land often 724 
compound to further wear away at the resilient capacity of populations.18 725 
 726 
Meteorological drought trends can be used to track potential population exposures.19 The 727 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) recommends the use of the Standard 728 
Precipitation Index (SPI) to characterize meteorological droughts around the world, where a 729 
severe drought is defined as periods where SPI < -1.5.20,21 A full description of methods and 730 
other data sources (ECMWF) can be found in Appendix 2.16 731 
 732 
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  733 
 734 
 735 
Floods and extreme precipitation also have severe health implications, and 15% of all deaths 736 
related to natural disasters are due to floods.23 In addition to immediate injury and death 737 
from flood water, longer-term impacts on health include spread of infectious disease and 738 
mental illness, both of which are exacerbated by the destruction of infrastructure, homes 739 
and livelihoods.24,25 740 
 741 
The second component of this new Indicator maps extreme rainfall events, as a proxy 742 
indicator of flood risk. In Watts et. al 2015, flood risk was estimated for 2090 by defining a 743 
flood event as a 5-day precipitation total exceeding the 10-year return level (a level of 744 
rainfall only expected once every ten years) in the reference period.1 This method has been 745 
adapted here to produce extreme rainfall trends from 2000 to 2016. An extreme rainfall 746 
event is defined as commencing when the 5-day rolling sum of daily total precipitation 747 
exceeds the 10-year return level in the 1986-2005 reference period, and ending when it 748 
drops below this value. The return values and events were calculated using the ERA-Interim 749 
daily precipitation dataset from ECMWF.16 Exposures were calculated as the sum of people 750 
at a location multiplied by the number of events at that location, measured in person-751 
events. A full account of the methods and data can be found in Appendix 2. 752 
 753 
As with drought, changes in extreme heavy rain vary regionally, with particularly significant 754 
increases in extreme heavy rainfall events evident in South America and South East Asia(see 755 
Appendix 2 for figure and further details) . Here, regional trends are more significant than 756 
global trends, reflecting the varying nature of climate change depending on the 757 
geographical region studied. 758 
 759 
 760 
 761 
 762 
Indicator 1.6: Lethality of weather-related disasters 763 
Headline finding: Annual frequencies of floods and extreme temperature events have 764 
increased since 1990, with no clear upward or downward trend in the lethality of these 765 
events. 766 
 767 
Providing global estimates of human exposure, morbidity, and mortality associated with 768 
extreme weather events is fraught with methodological complexities and gaps in reliable 769 
data. Projections forward demonstrate that left un-mitigated, climate change is expected to 770 
result in an additional 1.4 billion drought exposure events per year and 2 billion flood 771 
exposure events per year, by the end of the century.1 These projections are borne out in 772 
recent history, with clear increases in the annual frequencies of flood and temperature 773 
anomalies over the last 25 years. Whilst there are important trends within regions and 774 
income-groups in the lethality of weather-related disasters, no clear trend is seen at the 775 
global level, with the exception of a slight decline in the absolute numbers of those affected 776 
by floods. As section 2 of this report describes, governments and national health services 777 
are increasingly adapting to extreme weather events and climate change, with impressive 778 
results. These adaptation interventions and broader development initiatives present a 779 
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plausible explanation for the results identified here. Crucially, Indicator 4.1 makes clear that 780 
health and human wellbeing is impacted indirectly through the economic and social losses 781 
that result from such events.  782 
 783 
Indicator 1.6 makes use of the same methods and data sources (the Emergency Events 784 
Database (EM-DAT)) described in the 2017 Lancet Countdown report, and in Appendix 2.9,26  785 
 786 
 787 
 788 
 789 
 790 
Indicator 1.7: Global health trends in climate-sensitive diseases 791 
Headline finding: Although global health and development interventions have resulted in 792 
some impressive improvements in human health and wellbeing, mortality from two 793 
particularly climate-sensitive diseases - dengue fever and malignant skin melanoma – is still 794 
rising in regions most susceptible to both diseases. 795 
 796 
Climate change interacts directly and indirectly with a wide variety of disease processes, 797 
ultimately acting as a force multiplier for many of the existing challenges faced by the global 798 
public health community. Drawing out mortality estimates for climate-sensitive diseases 799 
calculated by the GBD helps to elucidate these macro-trends over time (figure 5).14 Climate 800 
change’s role in influencing these trends will vary depending on disease process, geography, 801 
and demographic profile of affected regions and populations. 802 
 803 
The reference category – all-cause mortality – shows a strong improvement in mortality 804 
rates in Africa, and a significant reduction in South East Asia. Diarrheal diseases also show 805 
marked decreases, especially in Africa. In contrast to this, mortality from dengue fever is 806 
clearly increasing rapidly, especially in regions most susceptible to its spread - South East 807 
Asia and the Americas. Mortality rates for malignant melanoma, which notably has a 808 
decadal delay, from exposure to mortality, and is associated with exposure to ultraviolet 809 
radiation, have increased markedly in Europe, the Americas, and the Western Pacific. The 810 
methods for this indicator are described in full in the 2017 Lancet Countdown report, and in 811 
Appendix 2.9  812 
 813 
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 814 
 815 
Figure 5. global trends in all-cause mortality and mortality from selected causes as 816 
estimated by the Global Burden of Disease 2017, for the period 1990 to 2016, by World 817 
Bank Regions. Source: Global Burden of Disease, 2016.14 818 
 819 
indicator 1.8: Climate-sensitive infectious diseases 820 
Headline finding: In 2016, global vectorial capacity for the transmission of dengue virus was 821 
the highest on record, rising to 9.1% and 11.1% above the 1950s baseline for Aedes aedypti 822 
and Aedes albopictus, respectively. 823 
 824 
Changing climatic conditions are a key determinant for the spread and impact of many 825 
infectious diseases. Understanding how climate change is altering the environmental 826 
suitability for disease vectors, pathogen replication and transmission is vital to 827 
understanding the consequences for human exposure. The 2017 Lancet Countdown analysis 828 
on dengue virus is expanded here, to include a seasonal analysis of dengue and global 829 
analysis of pathogenic Vibrio species and malaria. The second component of the indicator 830 
analyses publication trends of climate change-infectious disease research. 831 
 832 
Vectorial capacity is a measure of the capacity for vectors to transmit a pathogen to a host 833 
and is influenced by vector, pathogen and environmental factors. Compared to a 1950s 834 
baseline, climatic changes have increased global vectorial capacity for dengue in the 2010s 835 
(2011-2016 average) by 7.8% and 9.6% for Aedes aegypti and Aedes albopictus, respectively 836 
(figure 6). For both vectors, 2016 was the most suitable year on record. In addition, the 837 
seasonal dynamics of vectorial capacity for dengue from both vectors have lengthened and 838 
strengthened (Appendix 2). Model projections suggest this rise will continue for both 839 
vectors in step with GHG emissions (Appendix 2). The contribution of mobility and 840 
globalisation to the expansion of the dengue vector and dengue disease burden is important 841 
to note, alongside the impact of climate change. 842 
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 843 
 844 
 845 
Figure 6. Changes in global vectorial capacity for the dengue virus vectors Aedes aegypti and 846 
Aedes albopictus since 1950 (see Appendix 2 for projections to 2050). 847 
 848 
Turning to water-borne infectious diseases, in regions with suitable salinity conditions a 849 
consistent association between sea surface temperature (SST) anomalies and cases of 850 
pathogenic Vibrio infections has been reported.27-29 In 2018, a Vibrio indicator has been 851 
added to track the environmental suitability of coastal regions for Vibrio infections on the 852 
basis of SST and salinity. This was developed for Vibrio species that are pathogenic to 853 
humans, including V. parahaemolyticus, V. vulnificus and non-toxigenic V. cholerae (non-854 
O1/non-O139); Vibrio-caused illnesses (vibriosis) include gastroenteritis, wound infections, 855 
and septicemia and can be transmitted in brackish marine waters. A clear trend of rising 856 
suitability for Vibrio infections is observable globally (notably the Northern hemisphere), 857 
with 2017 being a particularly abnormal year of decreased suitability (figure 7). The 858 
percentage of coastal area suitable for Vibrio infections in the 2010s has increased at 859 
northern latitudes (40-70°N) by 3.5% compared to a 1980s baseline. In two higher risk focal 860 
regions, the Baltic and US northeast, increases of 24.0% and 27.0% have been observed in 861 
the area of coastline suitable over the same period (figure 7b and 7c). Similarly, the number 862 
of days suitable per year has almost doubled in the Baltic, extending the highest risk season 863 
by around 5 weeks (figure 7b). 864 
 865 
 866 
 867 
 868 
 869 
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a)     b)    c)870 
 871 
 872 
Figure 7. Change in suitability for pathogenic Vibrio outbreaks as a result of changing sea 873 
surface temperatures a) globally, divided into three latitudinal bands (northern latitudes = 874 
40-70°N; tropical latitudes = 25°S-40°N; and southern latitudes = 25-40°S); b) the Baltic and 875 
c) United States North East coast. 876 
 877 
 878 
A second new indicator addresses the changing suitability for the transmission of malaria. The 879 
indicator focuses on environmental suitability for Plasmodium falciparum (African continent) 880 
and P. vivax (other regions), the two dominant parasites causing disease worldwide. The 881 
indicator shows significant changes in suitability in highland areas of Africa, which has 882 
increased by 20.9% in the 2010s when compared to a 1950s baseline, with 2016 being the 883 
fourth most suitable year (after 2002, 1997 and 2006) since the beginning of the time series 884 
(27.7% rise ca. 1950s baseline). The expanded methods for all disease indicators are in 885 
Appendix 2. 886 
 887 
 888 
 889 
Figure 8. Environmental suitability for malaria 1950 to 2016, grouped by continent and 890 
elevation (high >=1500m, low <1500m). Results are for the dominant malarial parasite in 891 
each region. (P. falciparum in Africa; P vivax in other regions).  892 
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The final component of this indicator tracks research and published literature on climate 893 
change and infectious diseases. Overall, the number of publications in the previous 12 months 894 
remains high compared to historical levels, with a slight decrease in 2017 (75 publications) 895 
from a peak in 2016 (89 publications). A clear majority of papers continue to report on positive 896 
associations (see Appendix 2 for figure and further details). 897 
 898 
 899 
 900 
 901 
Indicator 1.9: Food security and under-nutrition 902 
Indicator 1.9.1:  Terrestrial food security and undernutrition 903 
Headline finding: 30 countries are currently experiencing downwards trends in yields, 904 
reversing a decade-long trend that had previously seen global improvement. Yield potential 905 
is estimated to be declining in every region, as measured by accumulated thermal time. 906 
 907 
Worldwide, there is more than sufficient food produced to feed the global population. The 908 
causes of food insecurity and undernutrition are hence both complex and multi-factorial, 909 
driven by factors beyond total food availability.30,31 However, food production is already 910 
being compromised by extremes of weather that are predicted to become more frequent 911 
and extreme; yield potentials are falling globally and many countries are already 912 
experiencing falling yields.32,33 913 
 914 
A multi-level indicator is presented, linking climate hazards and trends, crop yields and 915 
harvests, and undernutrition. Overall trends are tracked using globally-aggregated and 916 
country-level data, highlighting the extent to which negative impacts of climate change 917 
outweigh potential positive impacts on national nutrition and food security through varietal 918 
breeding, improved farming practices, and reductions in poverty. 919 
 920 
First, global grain potential is represented by current and future predictions of Accumulated 921 
Thermal Time (ATT) for maize, which acts as a proxy for yield potential, and in turn, food 922 
security. As ATT declines, so too does the viability of a given crop, resulting in failed 923 
harvests. Falling ATT for maize in each region suggests declining maize yield potential in 924 
each region and globally (figure 9 and Appendix 2).34 Second, the number of countries for 925 
which yields are trending downwards is tracked. This number fell from 56 to 32 between 926 
2000 and 2010, but has scarcely fallen since, reaching 30 in 2016. For some countries, where 927 
the yield gap (the difference between actual and maximum potential yield) is small, falling 928 
yields reflect the negative impact of climate change already outweighing any technological 929 
improvement.35 The third component of this indicator tracks undernutrition, aggregated at 930 
a global scale. Although rates and absolute numbers of undernutrition had declined over the 931 
past decade, a reversal of this trend and consequent rise in undernutrition is evident in 932 
recent years. 933 
  934 
  935 
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 936 
Figure 9. Accumulated Thermal Time as a proxy for maize yield. The dashed line is the 937 
average over the period 1961-1990, and the solid black line is an 11-year moving average.  938 
 939 
 940 
The methods and data sources utilised for this indicator have been improved on and 941 
expanded significantly since the 2017 Lancet Countdown report, to incorporate potential 942 
crop yield and actual crop production data, and are presented in full in Appendix 2; 943 
additional figures for this analysis are also available in Appendix 2.9,36 944 
 945 
 946 
Indicator 1.9.2: Marine food security and under-nutrition 947 
Headline finding: Sea surface temperatures (SST) have risen significantly in 16 of the 21 key 948 
fishing basins analysed, resulting in coral bleaching in many of these basins and threats to 949 
marine primary productivity expected to follow. 950 
 951 
This indicator on marine food security has been further developed since the 2017 Lancet 952 
Countdown report. Here, 21 basins have been analysed, selected for their geographical 953 
coverage and importance to marine food security.36 A multi-layered indicator is tracked for 954 
each basin, monitoring changes in SST and subsequent coral bleaching from thermal stress 955 
(abiotic indicators), alongside per-capita capture-based fish consumption (biotic indicator). 956 
The data presented is sourced from NASA and the US Environmental Protection Agency, 957 
with all methods described in full in Appendix 2.37,38 958 
 959 
Between 2003 and 2015, SST rose in 16 out of the 21 basins analysed, rising by 1.59oC 960 
globally in 2015 when compared with 1950 (figure 10 and additional figures in Appendix 2). 961 
Rising SST coincides with an increase in coral bleaching thermal stress (increased stress and 962 
risk of bleaching to corals resulting from prolonged rising temperatures) levels across many 963 
of these basins, further threatening marine primary productivity and a key source of protein 964 
for many populations. A full breakdown of coral bleaching thermal stress levels by basin is 965 
provided in Appendix 2. 966 
 967 
 968 
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 969 
Figure 10. Changes in Sea Surface Temperature (oC) for countries adjacent to and reliant on 970 
key FAO fishing basins from 2003 to 2015, using NASA Sea Surface Temperature (MODIS) 971 
data. (Source: NASA, 2017)37 972 
 973 
 974 
 975 
 976 
 977 
Indicator 1.10: Migration and population displacement 978 
Headline finding: Climate change is the sole contributing factor for thousands of people 979 
deciding to migrate and is a powerful contributing factor for many more migration decisions 980 
worldwide. 981 
 982 
Measuring the net migratory impact of climate change will always be one of the most 983 
methodologically complex aspects of this indicator. This is in large part due to the multiple 984 
factors that comprise any individual or community’s decision to migrate, as described by the 985 
extensive migration and mobilities literature. Attribution to climate change of forced 986 
migration or non-forced migration is complicated by the lack of support mechanisms to deal 987 
with climate change typically being more influential on population dynamics than climate 988 
change per se. Then, attributing health outcomes to migration-related decisions or lack of 989 
such options is another difficult step, although the forthcoming Lancet Commission on 990 
Migration and Health is elucidating aspects of the health effects of migration. 991 
 992 
Here, Appendix 2 re-analyses the work conducted in the 2017 Lancet Countdown report, 993 
following the definitions, scoping, and method described in Watts et al. (2017).9 It provides 994 
a lower bound of several thousand people who are now migrating with climate change as 995 
the sole contributing factor. Future projections are highly uncertain due to challenges in 996 
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projecting how society, technology, and politics will change over the coming decades. 997 
Nonetheless, in the absence of planning and interventions, several hundred million people 998 
could end up being vulnerable to forced migration, with climate change as the sole 999 
contributing factor.  1000 
 1001 
To improve estimates, further research suggestions are summarised in Appendix 2. 1002 
 1003 
 1004 
Conclusion 1005 
Section 1 presents indicators on the vulnerability, exposure, and impact of climate change 1006 
for human health. Overall, they provide clear evidence of the existing health effects of 1007 
climate change. Notably, vulnerability to heat has increased across all regions, exposures to 1008 
heatwaves have risen further, vectorial capacity for disease vectors continues to increase, 1009 
and terrestrial and marine food security threats have grown. The regional health impacts of 1010 
climate change and health vary by geography, as demonstrated clearly in the above 1011 
indicators on flood and drought, highlighting the need for more granular, national- and 1012 
local-level analyses. The indicators presented in section 1 will therefore continue to be 1013 
improved, with significant developments already in place. Work also continues on the 1014 
development of a proxy indicator for the crucial, and under-researched area of mental 1015 
health and climate change, with preliminary national-level results.  1016 
 1017 
Climate change aggravates risks to mental health and wellbeing when the frequency, 1018 
duration, intensity and unpredictability of weather-related hazards change.9 The resultant 1019 
weather impacts increase the number of people (re-)exposed to extreme events and their 1020 
consequent psychological problems, with suicide an extreme manifestation of trauma.39,40  1021 
Because of their rapidly growing frequency, duration, and intensity, heatwaves are of 1022 
particular concern, with strong evidence linking their occurrence to increases in population-1023 
level distress, hospital psychiatric admissions and suicides.41-44 Less obvious impacts of 1024 
weather-related hazards can be especially perilous, creating food shortages, homelessness 1025 
and displacement, and damaging public infrastructure, power and connectivity, agricultural 1026 
land and sacred places.45 These pressures can impair social cohesion, undermining critical 1027 
supports for mental health. Recent analysis examining the relationship between hot years 1028 
and suicide rates in Australia has been provided in Appendix 2.  1029 
 1030 
It is clear that the adaptation and mitigation efforts of governments and health 1031 
professionals matter immensely in determining the scale of the eventual health impacts of 1032 
climate change. Progress in these two areas, and on the economic, financial, and political 1033 
context on which they depend, is the focus of the remainder of this report. 1034 
Section 2: Adaptation, planning, and resilience for health 1035 
 1036 
Introduction 1037 
With the observed and future health impacts of climate change becoming increasingly 1038 
evident, and emissions trajectories committing the world to further warming, accelerated 1039 
adaptation interventions are needed to safeguard populations’ health. As the 2030 Agenda 1040 
demonstrates, strategies to improve community resilience often dovetail with poverty 1041 
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reduction and broader socio-economic development imperatives creating the possibility of 1042 
‘no regret scenarios’.1 1043 
 1044 
The health sector must be at the forefront of adaptation efforts, ensuring health systems, 1045 
hospitals, and clinics remain anchors of community resilience. This under-recognised, yet 1046 
growing area of practice, is the focus of section 2. Data availability is incomplete, providing 1047 
more insight into adaptation than resilience, and are predominantly allowing for process-1048 
based indicators. However, a number of the indicators have been improved on since 2017: 1049 
qualitative analyses of the content and quality of national adaptation strategies and 1050 
vulnerability & adaptation assessments in the health sector are included to complement 1051 
previous quantitative findings (Indicators 2.1 and 2.6); and the inclusion of health-specific 1052 
adaptation questions in survey tools and questionnaires for climate services (Indicators 2.2 1053 
and 2.5). In addition, this year’s report includes a new indicator assessing the adaptive 1054 
capacity to vector borne disease (Indicator 2.4). The indicators presented in this report, 1055 
show an overall trend of increased uptake of adaptation measures. However, whilst 1056 
adaptation activities may have increased, they do not guarantee resilience against future 1057 
climate change, and hence efforts to adapt to climate change must be redoubled. This is 1058 
largely dependent upon sufficient spending on adaptation (Indicator 2.7), funding 1059 
availability for adaptation (Indicator 2.8), and an improved understanding of how to most 1060 
effectively deliver resilience within health systems. 1061 
 1062 
 1063 
Indicator 2.1: National adaptation plans for health 1064 
Headline finding: In 2015, 30 out of 40 countries responding to the WHO Climate and Health 1065 
Country Survey reported having national health adaptation strategies or plans approved by 1066 
their respective health authority. 1067 
 1068 
This indicator tracks the policy commitment of national governments on health adaptation 1069 
to climate change. Revised data, based on the biennial WHO Climate and Health Country 1070 
Survey will be presented in the 2019 Lancet Countdown report. In the interim, a qualitative 1071 
analysis of 16 national health adaptation strategies and plans is presented here. Of note, as 1072 
the most current and available country strategies/plans were collected for this review, the 1073 
documents included may not correspond exactly to those reported on in the 2015 survey 1074 
findings.9 A full description of the methods used in this qualitative review can be found in 1075 
Appendix 3. 1076 
 1077 
Out of the 16 national health adaptation strategies/plans reviewed, only six were identified 1078 
as being the formal health component of a National Adaptation Plan (NAP) of the United 1079 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process, referred to as an H-1080 
NAP.50  1081 
 1082 
The goal of a national health adaptation strategy or plan should be to build the resilience of 1083 
the existing health system. Encouragingly, three-quarters of the countries (12 out of 16) had 1084 
established institutional arrangements to integrate climate change adaptation planning into 1085 
existing health-related planning processes. Almost all countries (15 out of 16) prioritized their 1086 
most critical climate-sensitive health outcomes in the national health adaptation 1087 
strategy/plan. Water-, food- and vector-borne diseases were the most widely considered 1088 
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climate-sensitive health outcomes, followed by direct injuries and deaths due to extreme 1089 
weather events (figure 11). Nearly two-thirds of countries (10 out of 16) outlined adaptation 1090 
measures to address specific health impacts, particularly for integrated risk monitoring, early 1091 
warning and climate informed health programs. Yet less concrete measures were proposed 1092 
for mental health, noncommunicable diseases, respiratory diseases and heat stress. Most 1093 
countries (12 out of 16) detailed a monitoring and evaluation process for the implementation 1094 
of their strategy/plan with ten of these countries proposing specific indicators for each 1095 
adaptation activity. 1096 
 1097 
 1098 
 1099 
 1100 
Figure 11. The climate-sensitive health outcomes prioritized by the countries in their 1101 
national health adaptation strategies/plans. *Direct injuries and death due to extreme 1102 
weather events. 1103 
 1104 
Indicator 2.2: City-level climate change risk assessments 1105 
Headline finding: Of the 478 global cities surveyed, 65% have either already completed or 1106 
are currently undertaking climate change risk assessments, with 51% of cities expecting 1107 
climate change to seriously compromise their public health infrastructure.  1108 
 1109 
Over 50% of the world’s population live in cities, generating 80% of global GDP and 1110 
consuming 60% of energy.47 Cities’ independent political and legal status often affords them 1111 
flexibility in developing a comprehensive adaptation response to climate change. This 1112 
indicator captures both the extent to which cities have developed their own climate change 1113 
risk assessments, and their own perception of the vulnerability of their public health 1114 
infrastructure to these threats. 1115 
 1116 
Globally, 48% of cities had completed a climate change impact assessment, with 17% 1117 
currently in progress. As part of these assessments, 51% of cities identified public health 1118 
infrastructure as being particularly vulnerable to climate change, and needing additional and 1119 
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Mental health
Other health outcomes
Heat stress
Noncommunicable diseases
Respiratory diseases
Nutrition and food security
Direct injuries and death*
Vector-borne diseases
Water- and food-borne diseases
Number of countries
Climate-sensitive health outcomes prioritized by countries in their 
national adaptation strategies/plans (countries assessed = 16)
Page | 35  
 
rapid intervention. Global inequalities in the capacity to conduct such assessments are 1120 
evident, with only 25% of cities in low-income countries doing so, as compared to 57% of 1121 
cities in high-income countries (see Appendix 3 for additional figures and further details). 1122 
Regional trends are similarly correlated with development.  1123 
 1124 
Data for this indicator is sourced from the Carbon Disclosure Project’s 2017 survey of 478 1125 
global cities, and is described in full in the 2017 Lancet Countdown report and Appendix 3.9  1126 
 1127 
 1128 
  1129 
 1130 
 1131 
Indicator 2.3: Detection, preparedness and response to health emergencies 1132 
Headline Finding: Despite a previous marked increase, a significant decline in national IHR 1133 
capacities, relevant to climate adaptation and resilience, has been observed in most of the 1134 
WHO world regions in 2017.  1135 
 1136 
In total, 85% of the WHO Member States responded to the 2017 International Health 1137 
Regulations (IHR) Monitoring questionnaire (see panel 6 of Watts et al., 2017 for details).9,48 1138 
Overall capacity scores have decreased for all four capacities in 2017 as compared to 2016: 1139 
human resources (9.9%), surveillance (5.3%), preparedness (8.5%) and response (7.8%). 1140 
Figure 22 presents progress in capacity scores from 2010 to 2017 by WHO region. 1141 
 1142 
The first of these capacities, human resources, has seen the most heterogeneous change 1143 
across WHO regions (figure 12a). Two regions experienced an increase in their capacity score: 1144 
Africa (11.8%) and Europe (7.1%); while the rest of the regions experienced a decrease in their 1145 
capacity score: Western Pacific (-21.3%), South East Asia(-16.6%), the Americas (-15.9%) and 1146 
the Eastern Mediterranean region (-8.0%).49 All regions experienced a decrease in 1147 
Surveillance capacity score (figure 12b), with Africa, the region experiencing the greatest 1148 
decrease (-8.4%), followed by the Eastern Mediterranean region (-8.1%), the Americas (-1149 
6.7%), South-East Asia (-6.5%,), Europe (-1.2%) and the Western Pacific region (-1.1%).50 All 1150 
regions except for Africa have seen a decrease in their preparedness capacity score.51 The 1151 
Africa region has maintained its capacity score from 2016 (figure 12c). The greatest decrease 1152 
was experienced by South-East Asia (18.3%), followed by the Western Pacific (12.1%), the 1153 
Eastern Mediterranean region (6.9%), the Americas (5.3%) and Europe (4.9%)). Similar to 1154 
Surveillance capacity, all regions have experienced a decrease in their Response capacity 1155 
score (figure 12d), with the greatest decrease experienced by the Eastern Mediterranean 1156 
region (-12.6%), followed by South-East Asia (-11.1%), the Americas (-10.2%), Africa (-6.8%), 1157 
the Western Pacific (-3.3%) and Europe (-2.4%).52 Importantly, these figures are affected by a 1158 
significant improvement in reporting rates, with full details in Appendix 3. 1159 
 1160 
A) 1161 
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B) 1163 
 1164 
 1165 
C) 1166 
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 1167 
 1168 
 1169 
D) 1170 
 1171 
 1172 
Figure 12 International Health Regulations capacity scores by WHO regions. A) Human 1173 
Resources capacity score, B) Surveillance capacity score, C) Preparedness capacity score, D) 1174 
Response capacity score. (Source: World Health Organization, 2018).49-52 1175 
 1176 
 1177 
 1178 
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Indicator 2.4: Climate change adaptation to vulnerabilities from mosquito-borne 1179 
diseases 1180 
Headline finding: Globally, improvements in public health have reduced vulnerability to 1181 
mosquito-borne diseases, with a 28% fall in global vulnerability observed from 2010-2016. 1182 
 1183 
As Indicator 1.8 makes clear, climate change is already contributing to changing patterns of 1184 
burden of disease from vector-borne illnesses, such as dengue fever and malaria. Robust 1185 
public health adaptation strategies can help to reduce these risks. This new indicator is the 1186 
first set in a suite that is in development, assessing current adaptive capacity to specific 1187 
climate-related risks. It maps the preparedness and response capacity of government 1188 
institutions to prevent, prepare for, cope with, and recover from these climate change 1189 
impacts. Using a process-based mathematical model, relevant country-level core capacities 1190 
(drawn from the WHO IHR, describing states of surveillance and response to infectious 1191 
disease outbreaks) were inversely related to the hazard of being exposed to the dengue 1192 
vector Aedes aegypti.53 1193 
 1194 
The index combines estimates of risk of exposure to Aedes aegypti that a population may 1195 
face, with the adaptive capacity of the public health system. Improvements in relevant areas 1196 
of core capacity over the study period translates into increased adaptive capacity 1197 
(decreased vulnerability) from mosquito-borne diseases. The largest decrease in 1198 
vulnerability was observed in the Western Pacific and the Americas. The only region to 1199 
experience an increase in vulnerability was the Eastern Mediterranean. Vitally, as exposures 1200 
to climate-sensitive diseases change (Indicator 1.8), the existing adaptive capacity reported 1201 
here may be threatened and thus vulnerability to such diseases could increase in future. The 1202 
data and methods for this new indicator are described in full in Appendix 3, where figures 1203 
are also available. 1204 
 1205 
 1206 
 1207 
 1208 
Indicator 2.5: Climate information services for health  1209 
Headline Finding: The national meteorological and hydrological services of 53 countries 1210 
report providing climate services to the health sector. 1211 
 1212 
This indicator has been enhanced since 2017, with the original survey now replaced by the 1213 
WMO Country Profile Database Integrated questionnaire.54 Not only does this provide 1214 
greater insights into the nature of the provision of climate services to the heath sector, but 1215 
it also allows for continuous updating of this indicator. A snapshot of responses as of May 1216 
2018 were used; the methods and data for this indicator are presented in full in Appendix 3, 1217 
with a full list of reporting countries described to provide climate services to the health 1218 
sector included. 1219 
 1220 
Of the 55 national meteorological and hydrological services of WMO Member States 1221 
providing climate services to the health sector, 14 were from Africa, 4 from the Eastern 1222 
Mediterranean, 18 from Europe, 11 from the Americas, 3 from South East Asia, and 5 from 1223 
the Western Pacific. Furthermore, services from 47 countries provided additional detail on 1224 
the status of climate service provision to the health sector: 10 reported to have initiated 1225 
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engagement with the health sector, 13 reported to be undergoing health sector needs 1226 
definition, 7 reported to be co-designing climate products with the health sector, 14 1227 
reported that tailored products are accessible to the health sector, and 3 reported that 1228 
climate services are guiding health sector’s policy decisions and investments plans. For the 1229 
remaining countries, it is unknown if they did not respond to this section of the survey or 1230 
they are not providing services. 1231 
 1232 
 1233 
Indicator 2.6: National assessments of climate change impacts, vulnerability, and 1234 
adaptation for health 1235 
Headline finding: In 2015, more than two thirds of countries responding to the WHO Climate 1236 
and Health Country Survey reported having conducted a national assessment of climate 1237 
change impacts, vulnerability and adaptation for health. 1238 
 1239 
To design a comprehensive health adaptation plan to effectively respond to climate risks 1240 
and reduce adverse health outcomes, a thorough assessment of a country’s potential health 1241 
impacts, vulnerability and adaptation needs is critical.55 Similar to indicator 2.1, revised data 1242 
from the WHO Climate and Health Country Survey is not available for this report. In the 1243 
interim, WHO has conducted a qualitative analysis of the nature and quality of 34 national 1244 
assessments. A brief summary is presented here, with methodological details presented in 1245 
Appendix 3. Of note, as the most recent and available country assessments were collected 1246 
for this review process, the assessments included may not correspond exactly to those 1247 
reported on in the 2015 survey findings. 1248 
 1249 
More than two thirds of countries that conducted national assessments (26 of 34) 1250 
anticipated the integration of these findings into the national climate change adaptation 1251 
strategy and would use the assessments to provide evidence-based policy options for health 1252 
systems and public health. Thirty-one countries evaluated the adaptive capacity of the 1253 
health sector to some extent with the highest number of countries assessing adaptive 1254 
capacity in the areas of programmes (28 countries), infrastructure (28 countries) and human 1255 
resources (25 countries). By comparing the countries’ assessments of vulnerability and 1256 
adaptive capacity with their proposed adaptation measures, 23 countries demonstrated a 1257 
corresponding needs-to-actions translation, according to the established criteria for the 1258 
analysis (Appendix 3). Detailed specifications of how adaptation measures would be 1259 
implemented, however, were often lacking and resource constraints, data availability and 1260 
capacity continue to be factors limiting the scope and coverage of national assessments. 1261 
Mirroring national adaptation actions, it is equally important to capture and better 1262 
understand how individual health systems are preparing and adapting to climate change 1263 
(panel 3). 1264 
 1265 
 1266 
Panel 2. Health system climate change risk assessment, preparedness and resilience 1267 
 1268 
Future iterations of the Lancet Countdown will aim to understand the extent to which individual 1269 
hospitals and health systems are adapting to climate change. A regular survey conducted as part of 1270 
the Health Care Climate Challenge (HCCC) is attempting to gather such information.56 Whilst the 1271 
data availability currently lacks sufficient global coverage and annual reproducibility, it provides 1272 
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some insight in to measures taken at the health system level, and is a potentially promising source of 1273 
data for a future indicator. 1274 
 1275 
Participants include health centers, hospitals and health systems, answering questions related to 1276 
climate change risk assessment and preparedness activities. Respondents to the survey are currently 1277 
only based in the US, UK, Australia, Brazil, France, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa, with the 1278 
vast majority in high-income countries. They also represent the most engaged health systems, 1279 
introducing an element of bias into any analysis. Both adaptation engagement (respondents who 1280 
have completed a vulnerability and adaptation assessment), and adaptation activity (respondents 1281 
who have begun to implement preparedness activities) provide potentially useful sources of data 1282 
going forward. 1283 
 1284 
While the level of engagement rose somewhat between 2015 and 2016, adaptation activity is much 1285 
lower, with only 57% of health systems, 22% of hospitals and 20% of health centers having 1286 
developed a plan to address future healthcare services delivery needs resulting from climate change. 1287 
Within this sample, this suggests that there may be more capacity to undertake risk assessments 1288 
than to plan and implement adaptation activities, or this may suggest a delay between risk 1289 
assessment and risk reduction efforts. 1290 
 1291 
 1292 
Indicator 2.7: Spending on adaptation for health and health-related activities 1293 
Headline finding: Globally, spending on adaptation for health is estimated at 4.8% (£11.68 1294 
bn) of all adaptation spending, and health-related spending is estimated at 15.2% (£32.65 1295 
bn).  1296 
This indicator tracks global adaptation spending on “health” (spending directly within the 1297 
formal healthcare sector) and “health-related” spending (spending in healthcare, disaster 1298 
preparedness, and agriculture). Such spending can significantly reduce the mortality of 1299 
climate-related disasters and so is important to monitor over time (panel 4). Using the 1300 
Adaptation and Resilience to Climate Change (A&RCC) data reported last year, health 1301 
adaptation spending increased by 8.2% in 2016/17, compared to 2015/16. This percentage 1302 
increase is larger than the change in total adaptation spending over the same period 1303 
(5.01%). 1304 
Globally, relative health adaptation spending has grown slightly from 4.6% of all adaptation 1305 
spending estimated by the A&RCC dataset in 2015/16, to 4.8% of all spending in 2016/17 (a 1306 
percentage change of 3.1%). For the wider health-related values, relative spending 1307 
increased from 13.5% to 15.2% of total A&RCC spending Grouped by World Bank Income 1308 
Group, the highest percentage change in health adaptation spending was in lower middle-1309 
income countries, followed by low-income countries, although the differences at this level 1310 
of aggregation are small (figure 13). Grouped by WHO Region, the highest percentage 1311 
change is observed in in Europe and South East Asia. However, it is important to note the 1312 
much lower spending in LICs and so despite large percentage changes, the total spending in 1313 
LICs is still far too low to meet needs in these countries. 1314 
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 1315 
Figure 13. For the Financial Years 2015/16 and 2016/17. A) Total health and health-related 1316 
A&RCC spending (£m), B) Percentage change in health and health-related A&RCC spending 1317 
from 2015/16 to 2016/17 (%), C) Percentage of health and health-related A&RCC as a 1318 
proportion of total spend (%), D) health and health-related A&RCC per capita (£). All plots 1319 
are disaggregated by World Bank Income Grouping.57 1320 
This indicator uses 2015/16 and 2016/17 data from the A&RCC dataset produced by 1321 
kMatrix, as used in last year’s report.9  1322 
Panel 3. Deaths from climate-related disasters versus health spending 1323 
The number of people killed in climate-related disasters is a function of the strength of the climate 1324 
hazard; the exposure of the population to the hazard related to the numbers of people in the hazard 1325 
location; and the underlying vulnerability of the population. Governments can reduce deaths to 1326 
climate-related disasters through disaster preparedness measures, such as early-warning systems 1327 
and via enhanced health services for those affected by a disaster. While it is recognised that 1328 
generally, countries with higher GDPs have lower numbers of disaster fatalities than countries with 1329 
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lower GDPs, this relationship does not necessarily hold when also accounting for the numbers of 1330 
people exposed to climate hazards (see Appendix 3, supplementary figures). 1331 
 1332 
Instead, there is a clear relationship between deaths per capita from climate-related disasters and 1333 
per capita health national spending. Countries that spend more on health tend to have fewer deaths 1334 
from such disasters. While health spending (per capita) is related to the GDP (per capita) the 1335 
relationship is not one to one (see Appendix 3 supplementary figures). Most notably, when ranking 1336 
countries by the percentage of GDP that is spent on health, for the first three quartiles of countries, 1337 
there is a decrease in deaths per capita from disasters related to climate hazards as the percentage 1338 
increases. This would appear to support the notion that as governments allocate more of their GDP 1339 
to health spending, per capita, they decrease the numbers of deaths (per capita) from climate-1340 
related disasters for all countries, except those in the highest percentage in health spending quartile. 1341 
This raises serious questions as to which elements of health spending are most effective at reducing 1342 
climate-related disaster deaths; for example, whether preparedness or primary health and/or 1343 
response play the greatest role in minimising mortality. 1344 
 1345 
 1346 
Indicator 2.8: Health adaptation funding from global climate financing mechanisms 1347 
Headline finding: The levels of adaptation funding fall far short of the commitments made in 1348 
the Paris Agreement, with just 472.82 million USD of adaptation funding for development in 1349 
2017; only 3.8% of the funding in 2017 was allocated for health adaptation. 1350 
 1351 
This indicator makes use of the same data source (Climate Funds Update) and methods as 1352 
described in the 2017 Lancet Countdown report.9,58 The last 12 months saw the approval of 1353 
a new health adaptation programme in East Asia and the Pacific to scale up health system 1354 
resilience in Pacific Island Least Developed Countries. At $17.85 million USD, this was the 1355 
only health-focused project approved in 2017, and represented 3.8% of the total 2017 1356 
adaptation spend for development ($472.82 million USD) – far less than the $100b USD 1357 
annually for adaptation efforts by 2020 promised at the 2010 Cancun Agreements under the 1358 
UNFCCC (see Appendix 3 for further details and a figure of these trends).59 1359 
 1360 
 1361 
 1362 
 1363 
Conclusion 1364 
 1365 
The data presented in section 2 suggests that health professionals and health systems are 1366 
increasingly considering and responding to the health effects of climate change. There 1367 
appears to be more and earlier engagement in higher-resource settings, although there is 1368 
evidence of adaptation activity in health sectors across the development and geographic 1369 
spectrum. There is evidence of health adaptation occurring incidentally, through broader 1370 
development initiatives, such as the IHRs (Indicator 2.3 and Indicator 2.4), and directly 1371 
through specific climate change adaptation initiatives (Indicators 2.1, 2.2 and 2.6). Whilst 1372 
absolute preparedness remains low, most trends followed here are moving in the right 1373 
direction, and where vulnerability has been tracked, risks related to climate change appear 1374 
to be decreasing. Despite this, absolute funding available for health adaptation remains 1375 
particularly low, limiting further progress on this issue. Furthermore, powerful technological  1376 
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and financial limits to adaptation exist that necessitate a joint-focus on mitigation as part of 1377 
the global response to climate change.2 1378 
 1379 
Measuring health adaptation and resilience to climate change presents numerous 1380 
methodological challenges, with most available metrics being proxy indicators of progress. 1381 
These measures must be interpreted with caution and applied to climate change, rather 1382 
than solely in their original context. This section has worked to present findings of indicators 1383 
for adaptation assessments, planning, implementation, and financing. 1384 
 1385 
  1386 
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Section 3: Mitigation Actions and Health Co-Benefits 1387 
 1388 
Introduction 1389 
This section presents evidence relating to climate change mitigation and associated near-1390 
term consequences for health. The health impacts of climate change, and communities’ 1391 
ability to adapt to it, both depend on the success of global mitigation efforts. But there are 1392 
also more immediate co-benefits of mitigation arising from the changes in harmful 1393 
exposures (e.g. reductions in particle air pollution) and health-related behaviours that 1394 
mitigation actions entail. The pace of the low-carbon transition therefore determines the 1395 
degree to which such benefits are realised. 1396 
 1397 
The changes since the 2017 report mostly reflect continuing trends or modest incremental 1398 
shifts. There continues to be a shift of investment towards clean energy technologies, with 1399 
accelerating growth in new low-carbon power generation (Indicator 3.3), and a downward 1400 
trend in global demand for coal (Indicator 3.2). However, global energy sector carbon 1401 
emissions remain largely unchanged (Indicator 3.1) and ambient air pollution levels remain 1402 
generally poor (Indicator 3.5), with estimated contributions of different sectors to PM2.5-1403 
attributable mortality presented in Indicator 3.5.2. There is accelerating uptake of electric 1404 
vehicles, but the electricity they use is still largely derived from fossil fuels (Indicator 3.6), 1405 
and they account for only a very small fraction of the vehicle fleet. 1406 
 1407 
 1408 
 1409 
Indicator 3.1: Carbon intensity of the energy system  1410 
Headline Finding: Since 1990, the carbon intensity of TPES has remained static with no 1411 
reduction, at 55-57 tCO2/TJ.  1412 
 1413 
This year’s report includes four years of additional data to 2015, and shows that the global 1414 
trend in carbon intensity remains broadly flat. This means an ever-widening gap from the path 1415 
of rapid reduction towards zero emissions by 2050 is needed to fulfil the Paris Agreement – 1416 
which would require a decline in carbon intensity approximately equivalent to an average 1417 
reduction of 1.0-1.6 tCO2/TJ per year (this carbon intensity metric estimates the tonnes of 1418 
CO2 for each unit of total primary energy supplied (tCO2/TJ). 1419 
 1420 
 1421 
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 1422 
Figure 14. Carbon intensity of Total Primary Energy Supply (TPES) for selected regions and 1423 
countries, and also global energy-related CO2 emissions. This carbon intensity metric 1424 
estimates the tonnes of CO2 for each unit of total primary energy supplied (tCO2/TJ). For 1425 
reference, carbon intensity of fuels (tCO2/TJ) are as follows: coal 95-100, oil 70-75, and 1426 
natural gas ~56. (Source. IEA, 2017)60 1427 
 1428 
Carbon intensity remains high despite the continued growth in renewable electricity 1429 
(Indicator 3.3), and the slowdown in coal demand (Indicator 3.2), in large part because the 1430 
growth in the use of other fossil fuels, such as oil and natural gas, has continued apace, 1431 
especially in the rapidly growing economies of Asia (figure 14). Growth in renewables still has 1432 
a long way to go to begin bending the intensity trend downwards, currently accounting for 1433 
only 24% of total electricity generated of which 16% is hydro-electricity. In final energy terms, 1434 
these sources only met 4.5% of global demand in 2015.60 1435 
 1436 
Figure 14 suggests that CO2 emissions levelled off from 2014, however recent analysis by the 1437 
Global Carbon Project suggests that emissions have begun rising again, with a projected 1.5% 1438 
increase between 2016 and 2017.60 This rise, due to stronger economic growth in China and 1439 
other developing regions, highlights that further structural change in the energy system is 1440 
needed to safeguard gains. In addition to the demand side ‘pull’ for clean energy investments, 1441 
policies are also needed that provide a supply side ‘push’ of existing fossil-based 1442 
infrastructure out of the system to ensure a timely transition.61 The methods and data sources 1443 
for this indicator are described in full in the 2017 Lancet Countdown report, and Appendix 1444 
4.9,60 1445 
 1446 
Indicator 3.2: Coal phase-out 1447 
Headline Finding: Since 2013, coal use has declined, resulting largely from reductions in 1448 
consumption in China, enhanced efficiency in coal-fired power generation, and continued 1449 
increase in use of shale gas in the US. In 2016, this downward trend continued, however 1450 
preliminary data suggests it may increase slightly in 2017.  1451 
 1452 
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Accelerating the downward trend in coal demand will be critical to meeting the climate goals 1453 
embodied in the Paris Agreement. For example, to push towards the 1.5°C target, coal use 1454 
levels need to be at 20% of 2010 levels by 2040, or around 30 Exajoules (EJ) (figure 15).62 1455 
While there is optimism that coal can be significantly reduced, particularly in China, the 1456 
question is whether it can be achieved quickly enough to meet climate goals and whether this 1457 
overall trajectory will also follow for countries with high growth demand.63 For example, 1458 
growth in India in 2016 was 2.4% (down from previous years), but consumption in member 1459 
states of ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations) , where coal is playing a small 1460 
but growing role in electricity production, increased by 6.2% in 2016. Furthermore, recent 1461 
estimates suggest a 1% increase in coal use in 2017.64 1462 
 1463 
If coal phase-out can be sustained, it is likely to have significant air pollution co-benefits 1464 
(Indicator 3.5), which in turn help offset the policy costs of mitigation.65,66 Crucially, 1465 
renewable generation has become increasingly cost-competitive, with recent auctions in 1466 
India placing solar as the cheapest available form of electricity generation.67,68 1467 
 1468 
 1469 
Figure 15 TPES coal use in selected countries and regions, and global TPES coal. (Source. IEA, 1470 
2017).60 1471 
 1472 
 1473 
 1474 
There has also been strong political momentum since COP23 (December 2017), with a 1475 
number of countries pledging to phase-out coal use (for instance, the UK, France, and 1476 
Canada), forming the “Powering Past Coal Alliance”.70 Further, twenty additional countries 1477 
committed at the most recent UN climate summit to phase-out the use of coal fired power 1478 
generation by 2030, with a few countries, including France, Italy and the UK, aiming to 1479 
phase-out coal earlier.71 Other countries have included coal reduction targets in their 1480 
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) of the Paris Agreement.72 For instance, 1481 
Indonesia has stated that coal will make up no more than 30% of their energy supply by 1482 
2025 and 25% by 2050. Such commitments are crucial given coal demand continues to 1483 
increase, particularly across Asia (figure 15); of the 60 GW of new coal plants installed 1484 
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globally in 2017 (100 GW in 2015), two thirds were in India and China.73 Additional figures 1485 
and details are available in Appendix 4. 1486 
 1487 
 1488 
Indicator 3.3: Zero-carbon emission electricity 1489 
Headline Finding: In 2017, 157 GW of renewable energy was installed (143 GW in 2016) 1490 
compared to 70 GW (net) of fossil fuel capacity installation, continuing the trajectory of the 1491 
trend reported last year. 1492 
 1493 
Low carbon electricity is booming, with strong prospects for displacing fossil fuels, such as 1494 
coal, in the electricity generation sector due its cost-competitiveness. Globally, this is 1495 
playing out with much more investment in renewable than fossil-based capacity, with 1496 
renewable capacity installations in 2017 being more than double that of fossil fuel capacity. 1497 
 1498 
Approximately 30% of current global generation is from zero-carbon sources, with the 1499 
majority coming from hydro and nuclear. In 2015, 5% was from ‘new’ renewables (solar and 1500 
wind), rising from 0.5% in 2000. This growth is particularly evident in the US, China, North 1501 
West Europe, and India, all of which are expanding their renewables deployment (figure 16a 1502 
and 16c). The increasing shares of renewable generation result in either displacing fossil 1503 
generation or meeting a portion of new demand growth, reducing the need for investment in 1504 
fossil fuels (figure 16d). The data and methods for this indicator are reported in the 2017 1505 
Lancet Countdown report and Appendix 4.9,69 1506 
 1507 
a) b) 
  
c) d) 
  
 1508 
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Figure 16. Renewable and zero-carbon emission electricity generation. a) Electricity 1509 
generated from zero carbon sources, TWh; b) Share of electricity generated from zero 1510 
carbon sources; c) Electricity generated from renewable sources (excl. hydro), TWh; d) 1511 
Share of electricity generated from renewable sources (excluding hydro). (Source: IEA and 1512 
IRENA, 2017)69 1513 
 1514 
 1515 
Indicator 3.4: Access to clean energy 1516 
Headline finding: The number of people without connections to electricity fell from 1.7 billion 1517 
in 2000 to 1.1 billion in 2016, and many countries will achieve electricity for all by 2030, with 1518 
the greatest gains coming in East and South East Asia. Conversely, over 2.8 billion people still 1519 
go without healthy, clean and sustainable cooking fuel or technologies; the same level as in 1520 
2000.  1521 
 1522 
The reduction in the number of people without access to electricity from 1.7 billion in 2000 1523 
to 1.1 billion in 2016 is primarily due to an increase in new connections made to a centralised 1524 
grid, though modest gains continue for decentralised or micro-grids. Most new access was 1525 
achieved using electricity generated with fossil fuels, highlighting a key challenge in moving 1526 
towards a decarbonised energy system. Much of this growth has been driven by coal-1527 
generated power stations in India, China and South East Asia; at 37%, coal remains the main 1528 
fuel used in global electricity production.60 Although strong economic, health and social 1529 
benefits come from increased use of electricity, there are costs (such as exacerbated outdoor 1530 
ambient air pollution and GHG emissions) that will vary depending on how electricity is 1531 
provided (Indicator 3.5). The residential sector’s energy mix has changed over 15 years 1532 
alongside access to electricity, which has been driven largely by fossil fuel generation. The 1533 
complicated nature of the relationship between energy access and health is fraught, with 1534 
local synergies and trade-offs (see panel 5). 1535 
 1536 
Access and use of clean fuels and technologies for cooking has seen limited improvement 1537 
since 2000 and in a number of countries negative trends have been observed as the access 1538 
gap increases. Access to clean cooking remains an intransigent problem, with around 3 billion 1539 
people (1.9 billion in developing Asia and 850 million in sub-Saharan Africa) without clean 1540 
cooking fuel or technologies in 2016, exposing vulnerable populations to high levels of 1541 
harmful indoor air pollution, estimated to cause 3.8 million deaths per year.74 Biomass 1542 
remains the single largest fuel source in the residential sector, which outlines the challenge 1543 
of access to clean and modern fuels. Appendix 4 provides further details and a figure on the 1544 
proportional national share of energy types for the residential sector for selected countries. 1545 
 1546 
 1547 
 1548 
 1549 
 1550 
 1551 
 1552 
 1553 
 1554 
 1555 
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Panel 4. Energy, health and the Sustainable Development Goals 1556 
 1557 
The 2030 UN Agenda for Sustainable Development is a comprehensive global plan of action for 1558 
people, planet and prosperity, comprised of 17 SDGs and 169 Targets to be achieved by 2030. SDG 7 1559 
aims to ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy, and provides an 1560 
example of a Goal which delivers supporting infrastructure that underpins the achievement of other 1561 
SDGs.  1562 
 1563 
In recognition of these interactions, recent analysis of efforts to achieve SDG 7 and the delivery of 1564 
the 169 Targets reveals evidence of 143 synergies and 65 trade-offs.76 There are many 1565 
interdependencies between energy and SDG 3 on health (ensure healthy lives and promote 1566 
wellbeing for all at all ages), including evidence of synergies with eight of the thirteen targets, and 1567 
trade-offs with five. Synergies exist, for instance, with Target 3.2 (end preventable deaths of children 1568 
and newborns). Access to electricity supports using medical equipment at health centres, ensuring 1569 
good surgery/delivery conditions, for pre-natal and neo-natal care, and for storage of medical 1570 
supplies. Yet, there are potential trade-offs where, for example, electricity access (7.1) is provided 1571 
with non-carbon neutral sources, with likely detrimental impacts on human health through air 1572 
pollution (Targets 3.4, 3.9) and climate change (SDG 13). 1573 
 1574 
The SDGs provide an important opportunity to realise the positive interactions between goals such 1575 
as energy and health, and to minimise the negative outcomes. However, these relationships are 1576 
often context-specific, requiring consideration of how actions to achieve one SDG may reinforce or 1577 
undermine progress towards another. For energy and health, the needs will differ according to scale: 1578 
for instance, communities cooking with firewood will require different solutions than cities dealing 1579 
with high levels of ambient particulate matter from wood burning from heating homes.  1580 
 1581 
 1582 
 1583 
 1584 
Indicator 3.5: Exposure to ambient air pollution  1585 
An estimated 7 million people die each year from air pollution, 4.2 million of which results 1586 
from ambient air pollution.77 Much of this pollution is related to combustion processes, 1587 
which would be substantially reduced by the achievement of climate change mitigation 1588 
targets to phase-out dependence on fossil fuels. Yet rural areas are not spared, facing 1589 
significant health burdens and air pollution from agricultural practices and household fuel 1590 
use. 1591 
 1592 
 1593 
Indicator 3.5.1: Exposure to air pollution in cities  1594 
Headline finding: From 2010 to 2016, air pollution concentrations have worsened in almost 1595 
70% of cities around the globe, particularly in LMICs. Populations in 90% of cities now 1596 
experience air pollution levels above the WHO’s guideline of 10 µg/m3. 1597 
 1598 
Trends between 2010 and 2016 in urban concentrations of fine particulate matter (PM2.5) 1599 
were analysed from the Data Integration Model for Air Quality (DIMAQ) for 308 globally-1600 
representative cities of the Sustainable Healthy Urban Environments (SHUE) database.78,79 1601 
Annual average levels of PM2.5 increased in 208 (67.5%) of these cities and decreased in 100 1602 
(32.5%), with an average increase of 3.6 µg.m-3 a year (unweighted by population) (figure 1603 
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17). The number above the WHO’s annual guideline of 10 μg.m-3 increased from 254 1604 
(82.5%) to 268 (87.0%).  1605 
 1606 
 1607 
Figure 17. Mean of annual average PM2.5 concentrations over the period 2010-2016 for 1608 
SHUE cities by WHO region (blue lines) estimated using DIMAQ.78 Also shown are the range 1609 
for all cities (light blue shaded area) and cities with the largest decrease (green dotted lines) 1610 
and increase (red dotted lines) over the period based on linear trends. 1611 
 1612 
 1613 
These estimates are consistent with those in 4,000 cities covered by the most recent update 1614 
of the WHO’s air pollution database.80 Concentrations in the majority of cities remain well 1615 
above recommended targets, especially in low- and middle-income settings,81 and in part 1616 
reflect the slow pace of change towards a low carbon world.  1617 
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 1618 
 1619 
Indicator 3.5.2: Premature mortality from ambient air pollution by sector 1620 
Headline Finding: Ambient air pollution resulted in more than 2 million premature deaths 1621 
globally in 2015 from fine particulates alone. Coal use accounts for approximately 16% of air 1622 
pollution related premature mortality globally, making its phase-out a crucial ‘no-regret’ 1623 
intervention for public health. 1624 
 1625 
Indicator 3.5.2 reports premature mortality from ambient PM2.5, attributed to individual 1626 
emission sectors by region. It is derived from calculations with the GAINS model, which 1627 
calculates emissions of all precursors of PM2.5 on a detailed breakdown of economic sectors 1628 
and fuels used. Underlying activity data are based on statistics by the International Energy 1629 
Agency (IEA).82 1630 
 1631 
Emissions and concentrations correspond to the year 2015 and are calculated from updated 1632 
statistics of the World Energy Outlook 2017. The geographical coverage has been expanded 1633 
since the 2017 report to global coverage, and the breakdown refined to quantify 1634 
contributions from coal combustion in all sectors (figure 18). Although the analysis is 1635 
performed by country, results are aggregated to regions for clarity. 1636 
 1637 
 1638 
 1639 
Figure 18: Health impacts of exposure to ambient fine particulate matter (PM2.5) in 2015, by 1640 
key sources of pollution by WHO region. Coal as a fuel is highlighted by hatching. Country 1641 
aggregations see text. 1642 
 1643 
The contribution of individual sectors to the total air pollution related premature mortality 1644 
varies regionally, but multiple sources contribute in each region. Large contributions come 1645 
from the residential sector (much from solid fuel (biomass and coal) and kerosene used for 1646 
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household heating and cooking); industry (dominant in East Asia), electricity generation, 1647 
transport, and agriculture (from burning of agricultural waste and secondary inorganic 1648 
aerosol formation). Coal is a key target for early phase-out because it is particularly polluting 1649 
regarding both CO2 and particulate matter. It is mainly used in electricity generation, 1650 
industry, and (in some countries) households. 1651 
 1652 
In total, exposure to ambient air pollution is estimated to have contributed to almost 3 1653 
million premature deaths globally (almost 2 million in Asia, 130,000 in the Americas, more 1654 
than 300,000 in Africa, and almost 500,000 in Europe) in 2015. On average, globally more 1655 
than 460,000 premature deaths from air pollution are related to coal combustion (about 1656 
16% of premature deaths); this rises to about 18% of premature deaths in Asia. Regional 1657 
contributions vary from 9% in Southeast Asia, 14% in South Asia, to almost 30% in China and 1658 
more than 40% in Mongolia, indicating large potentials for direct health benefits of coal 1659 
phase-out. China and India are particularly affected, with an estimated 911,000 and 525,000 1660 
premature deaths from ambient air pollution, respectively; coal accounts for approximately 1661 
204,000 and 107,000 of these deaths, respectively. In the EU-28, premature mortality from 1662 
ambient air pollution totalled about 310,000 in 2015; 54,000 premature deaths were from 1663 
coal and 42,000 from the transport sector. Household fuel combustion is also a significant 1664 
contributor, accounting for a total of 678,000 premature deaths globally in 2015 from 1665 
ambient air pollution (136,000 from coal) and many more from indoor air pollution, and 1666 
hence even larger reductions in premature mortality could be achieved through a transition 1667 
to clean household fuels.{World Health Organization, 2016 #399} 1668 
 1669 
 1670 
Indicator 3.6: Clean fuel use for transport 1671 
Headline Finding: Global road transport fuel use (TJ) increased 2% from 2013 to 2015 on a per 1672 
capita basis. While fossil fuels continue to dominate, the growth in use of non-fossil fuels 1673 
outpaced fossil fuels in recent history, rising by 10% over the same period. 1674 
 1675 
Fuels used for transport currently produce more than half the nitrogen oxides emitted 1676 
globally and a significant proportion of particulate matter, posing a significant threat to 1677 
human health.83  These pollutants are predominantly urban in their nature and persist as a 1678 
significant contribution to urban ambient air pollution and of pollutant related deaths 1679 
(indicator 3.5), of which two-thirds are related to air pollution. This indicator monitors 1680 
global trends in levels of fuel efficiency and the transition away from the most polluting and 1681 
carbon-intensive transport fuels; it follows the metric of fuel use for road transportation on 1682 
a per capita basis (TJ/person) by type of fuel.84,85 1683 
 1684 
Globally, despite notable gains for electricity and biofuels, road transport continues to be 1685 
powered almost exclusively by fossil fuels (figure 19). Since the previous publication, the use 1686 
of non-fossil fuels (electricity and biofuels) has continued to out-pace fossil fuel energy 1687 
rising over 10% on a per capita basis compared to an overall growth of 2% for fossil fuels 1688 
from 2013 to 2015. This trend had a small, but notable, impact on the overall share of non-1689 
fossil fuel energy for road transport, which rose from 3.9% to 4.2% over these two years. 1690 
 1691 
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 1692 
 1693 
 1694 
Figure 19. Per capita fuel use by type (TJ/person) for road transport with all fuels (left) and 1695 
non-fossil fuels only (right). (Source: IEA, 2016) 86 1696 
 1697 
The take up of electric vehicles across the global motor vehicle stock has increased by a 1698 
further 1 million vehicles, or 50% from 2016.87 There are now more than 2 million electric 1699 
vehicles on the road and global per capita electricity consumption for road transport grew 1700 
by 13% from 2013 to 2015.88 In OECD countries, per capita electricity consumption for 1701 
transport more than doubled compared to a 10% increase in non-OECD. In China, per capita 1702 
electricity use was five times the global average due to its high market share of electric 1703 
vehicles. In 2016, China accounted for more than 40% of the electric cars sold globally (see 1704 
Appendix 4 for further details and figure of these trends).88 1705 
 1706 
 1707 
 1708 
 1709 
Indicator 3.7: Sustainable travel infrastructure and uptake 1710 
Headline Finding: Cycling comprised less than 7% of total modal share for one fifth of global 1711 
cities sampled from the SHUE database and stratified by income, population size, and 1712 
geography. 1713 
 1714 
Whilst the shift to clean fuels is imperative, GHG emissions and those of air pollutants can 1715 
also be reduced by moving from private motorized transport to more sustainable modes of 1716 
urban travel (such as public transport, walking and cycling). This reduces emissions from 1717 
vehicles, crucial for addressing urban air pollution (Indicator 3.5.1) and has several health 1718 
co-benefits. Focusing on sustainable travel infrastructure and uptake in urban areas, this 1719 
section focuses on cycling modal share, presenting the data collected over the last decade 1720 
from 48 of all the randomly sampled cities across the world (stratified by national wealth, 1721 
population size, and Bailey’s Ecoregion) in the SHUE database.89 Mode share data come 1722 
from travel surveys of individual cities, national census data, governmental and non-1723 
governmental reports (Appendix 4). 1724 
 1725 
Within the sample, most cities have low cycling levels, with less than 10% of trips made by 1726 
cycling. However, cycling levels are high in some Western Pacific cities, notably in Cambodia 1727 
and China, and European cities, such as Copenhagen. Nonetheless, relatively low levels of 1728 
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cycling persist in the Americas, Eastern Mediterranean and many European cities (see 1729 
Appendix 4 for figure on proportion of trips made by cycling vs per capita GDP for 48 cities) 1730 
 1731 
 1732 
 1733 
 1734 
Increasing the level of cycling in some settings is challenging, but there is room for 1735 
improving cycling mode shares in many cities. Evidence suggests that good cycling 1736 
infrastructure, integration with public transport, training of both cyclists and motorists, as 1737 
well as making driving inconvenient and expensive, may help make cycling more 1738 
attractive.90,91 A full description of the data and methods for this indicator is available in 1739 
Appendix 4. 1740 
 1741 
 1742 
Indicator 3.8: Ruminant meat for human consumption 1743 
Headline Finding: The amount of ruminant meat available for human consumption 1744 
worldwide has decreased slightly from 12.09 kg/capita per year in 1990, to 11.23 kg/capita 1745 
per year in 2013. The proportion of energy (kcal/capita per day) available for human 1746 
consumption from ruminant meat decreased marginally from 1.86% in 1990 to 1.65% in 1747 
2013. 1748 
 1749 
Defining and tracking meaningful changes in sustainable, healthy food production presents 1750 
multiple challenges. The 2017 report presented ruminant meat for human consumption 1751 
(which decreased slightly from 12·09 kg/capita per year in 1990, to 11·23 kg/capita per year 1752 
in 2013) because the production of ruminant meat, from cattle in particular, dominates GHG 1753 
emissions from the livestock sector (estimated at 5·6–7·5 gigatonnes of CO2e per year).9 1754 
Although meat is a highly nutritious food, consumption of red meat, particularly processed 1755 
red meats, has known associations with adverse health outcomes.92,93 The major limitation 1756 
of this indicator is that it reflects only one aspect of sustainable diets, which is unlikely to 1757 
have equal health implications for high-income countries with excessive ruminant meat 1758 
consumption and low-income countries with low ruminant meat consumption. Tracking 1759 
progress towards more sustainable diets requires standardised and continuous data on food 1760 
consumption and related GHG emissions throughout food product life cycles. This would 1761 
require annual nationally representative detailed dietary survey data on food consumption. 1762 
Efforts to compile data and ensure comparability are underway, but their current format is 1763 
not suitable for global monitoring of progress towards optimal dietary patterns. The 1764 
collaboration will continue to work on developing a standardised indicator on sustainable 1765 
diets. 1766 
 1767 
 1768 
Indicator 3.9: Healthcare sector emissions 1769 
Headline finding: No systematic global standard for measuring the GHG emissions of the 1770 
healthcare sector exists, but a number of healthcare systems in the UK, US, Australia and 1771 
around the world are working to measure and reduce their GHG emissions. 1772 
 1773 
Comprehensive national GHG emissions reporting by the healthcare system is currently only 1774 
routinely performed in the UK, where NHS emissions reduced by 11% from 2007 to 2015, 1775 
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despite an 18% increase in activity.94 In Australia, CO2 emissions of the health care sector 1776 
were estimated at 35,772 kilotons in 2014-15, representing 7% of Australia’s total 1777 
emissions.95 In the US, recent work has estimated the GHG emissions of the health care 1778 
sector at 655 million metric tons, representing nearly 10% of US emissions.96 Elsewhere, 1779 
selected healthcare organisations, facilities, and companies provide self-reported estimates 1780 
of emissions, however this is rarely standardized across sites. The Lancet Countdown will 1781 
continue to work on developing a standardised indicator on health sector emissions. 1782 
 1783 
 1784 
Conclusion 1785 
The indicators presented in this section provide an overview of activities relevant to public 1786 
health from climate change mitigation in the energy, transport, food and healthcare sectors. 1787 
The indicators present a mixed picture. Positive trends include ongoing commitments to the 1788 
phase-out of coal in many countries, the fact that renewable energy continues to account 1789 
for most added capacity annually, and the increasingly rapid uptake of electric vehicles. 1790 
However, the scale of the challenge in reversing the past trend and rapidly reducing GHG 1791 
emissions is immense. Mitigation action to-date is still far short of the level required to 1792 
meet the aspirations of the Paris Agreement to keep warming “well below” 2°C. Not only is 1793 
this a concern for limiting the future harms of climate change, but it means many near-term 1794 
benefits for health, such as those from improved air quality, are not being realised. Rapid 1795 
acceleration of action in almost all sectors and across all regions is still needed.  1796 
 1797 
  1798 
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Section 4: Finance & Economics 1799 
 1800 
Introduction 1801 
So far, indicators in the first section of the Lancet Countdown’s 2018 report have highlighted 1802 
the health impacts of climate change, whilst those in sections 2 and 3 detail the adaptation 1803 
and mitigation interventions deployed to respond to this public health challenge. Section 4 1804 
focuses on the financial and economic enablers of a transition to a low-carbon economy, 1805 
and the implications of inaction. Although on the face of it, some of the indicators 1806 
presented do not have an immediately obvious link to human wellbeing (for example, 1807 
Indicator 4.3 - ‘investment in coal capacity’), they are often important up-stream 1808 
determinants and drivers of the processes described in Sections 1 to 3. 1809 
The consequences of climate change come with clear costs, both to human health and the 1810 
economy, including through increased healthcare costs and decreased workforce 1811 
productivity. However, there are also health and economic benefits to be gained from 1812 
tackling climate change, beyond avoiding the potential costs of inaction. Markandya et al 1813 
(2018) estimate that the global cost of reducing GHG emissions in line with the aims of the 1814 
Paris Agreement could be offset by the economic value of improved health associated with 1815 
the co-benefit of reduced air pollution alone, by a ratio of 2:1.97 1816 
The eight indicators in this section fall into four broad themes: the economic costs of 1817 
climate change; investing in a low-carbon economy; economic benefits of tackling climate 1818 
change; and pricing GHG emissions from fossil fuels. The methodologies and datasets used 1819 
here closely mirror those from the 2017 Lancet Countdown report, with no significant 1820 
changes to the indicators in this year’s report.9 The nature of economic and financial data 1821 
allows for significant updates despite the regular annual update cycle of the Lancet 1822 
Countdown. Appendix 5 provides a more detailed discussion of the data and methods used, 1823 
as initially described in the 2017 Lancet Countdown report.9 1824 
 1825 
Indicator 4.1: Economic losses due to climate-related extreme events 1826 
Headline Finding: In 2017, a total of 712 events resulted in $326 billion in overall economic 1827 
losses, with 99% of losses in low-income countries remaining uninsured. This is almost triple 1828 
the total economic losses experienced in 2016. 1829 
 1830 
The economic costs of extreme climate-related events, borne by individuals, communities, 1831 
and countries, often compounds the direct health effects described in Indicators 1.2 – 1.6. 1832 
These economic costs often result in insidious, indirect effects on health and wellbeing in 1833 
the subsequent months-to-years. With projections suggesting the frequency and intensity of 1834 
these events will increase significantly, this indicator tracks the present-day total annual 1835 
economic losses (insured and uninsured) across country income groups relative to GDP, 1836 
resulting from climate-related extreme events (figure 20). 1837 
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 1838 
Figure 20. Economic Losses from Climate-Related Events Relative to GDP. 1839 
 1840 
The data for this indicator is sourced from Munich Re’s NatCatSERVICE, with climate-related 1841 
events categorised as meteorological, climatological, and hydrological events (geophysical 1842 
events are excluded). The methodology used has not changed since 2017, and is described 1843 
in-full there, and in Appendix 5, along with data for 1990-2017.9,98 1844 
Global economic losses due to extreme climate-related events in 2017 were $327 billion, 1845 
around triple the value for 2016. The vast majority of this increase in economic losses is in 1846 
high-income countries, where losses relative to GDP increased from $1.44/$1000 GDP to 1847 
$5.58/$1000 GDP. Economic losses in low-income countries decreased slightly between 1848 
2016 and 2017 in both absolute terms and per unit GDP. However, whereas nearly half of 1849 
the losses in high-income countries were insured, it remains that just 1% of low-income 1850 
country losses were insured. 1851 
 1852 
Indicator 4.2: Investments in zero-carbon energy and energy efficiency 1853 
Headline Finding: In 2017, proportional investment in zero-carbon energy and energy 1854 
efficiency decreased as a proportion of total energy system investment, whilst fossil fuels 1855 
increased. However, this is in part due to the declining costs of renewables. 1856 
 1857 
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 1858 
Indicator 4.2 monitors global investment in zero-carbon energy, and in energy efficiency 1859 
(both as a proportion of the total energy system, and in absolute terms). All values reported 1860 
are in US$2017, with data sourced from the IEA.99-101 1861 
 1862 
Figure 21. Annual Investment in the Global Energy System. 1863 
 1864 
The methods and data sources for this indicator have not changed since the 2017 Lancet 1865 
Countdown report, and are outlined in detail there, and in Appendix 5. The IEA estimated 1866 
that in order to maintain a 50% chance of limiting global average temperature rise to 2C, 1867 
cumulative investment in the energy system from 2014 to 2035 must reach $53 trillion, with 1868 
50% of this invested in zero-carbon energy and energy efficiency.102 1869 
 1870 
Total investment in the global energy system reduced by 2% in real terms between 2016 1871 
and 2017. Investment in fossil fuels reduced slightly, due to lower investment in coal 1872 
electricity generation capacity (see Indicator 4.3), but offset to a large degree by increased 1873 
investment in upstream oil and gas. Investment in zero-carbon energy also decreased due to 1874 
a substantial reduction in new nuclear investment, but also due to a continuation of 1875 
declining unit costs for renewables (e.g. solar PV reduced in cost by 15% between 2016 and 1876 
2017). Investment in energy efficiency continued to increase. However, overall, between 1877 
2016 and 2017, fossil fuels increased slightly as a proportion of total energy system 1878 
investment, whilst zero-carbon energy and energy efficiency decreased (from 33% to 1879 
32%).104 1880 
 1881 
 1882 
Indicator 4.3: Investment in new coal capacity 1883 
Headline Finding: Investment in new coal capacity reduced substantially in 2017, reaching 1884 
its lowest level in at least 10 years, from a possible all-time peak in 2015. 1885 
 1886 
Indicator 4.3 tracks global annual investment in the most CO2-intensive method of 1887 
generating electricity – the combustion of coal in coal-fired power plants. Figure 22 makes 1888 
360 373 335
227 228 235
271 300 303
1002 937 927
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
2000
2015 2016 2017
U
S$
2
0
1
7
 B
ill
io
n
Renewables & Nuclear Energy Efficiency Electricity Networks Fossil Fuels
Page | 59  
 
use of data from the IEA to present an index of annual investment in new coal capacity from 1889 
2006 to 2017. 1890 
 1891 
 1892 
Figure 22. Annual investment in coal-fired capacity from 2006 to 2017 (an index score 100 1893 
corresponds to 2006 levels). (Source: IEA,2018)100,101 1894 
 1895 
The methods and data sources (IEA)  for this indicator have not changed since the 2017 1896 
Lancet Countdown report, and are outlined in detail there, and in Appendix 5.9,100 1897 
  1898 
As illustrated in Figure 22, investment in new coal-fired electricity generating capacity 1899 
reduced substantially in 2017, continuing the experienced in 2016. This is largely a result of 1900 
fewer new plants being commissioned in China and India. Investment in new coal capacity is 1901 
at its lowest in over 10 years, with the IEA suggesting that investment in coal-fired capacity 1902 
having reached an all-time peak in 2015.103 In addition, the retirement of existing coal-fired 1903 
capacity offset nearly half of new capacity additions in 2017.104 1904 
 1905 
 1906 
Indicator 4.4: Employment in renewable and fossil fuel energy industries 1907 
Headline Finding: In 2017, renewable energy provided 10.3 million jobs – an increase of 1908 
5.7% from 2016. Employment in fossil fuel extraction industries also increased to 11 million – 1909 
an 8% increase from 2016. 1910 
 1911 
As the low-carbon transition gathers pace, fossil fuel energy industries and associated jobs 1912 
will decline. Employment in some key fossil fuel industries, such as coal mining, have well 1913 
documented impacts on human health.9 However, in their place new low-carbon industries 1914 
and employment opportunities, such as in the renewable energy sector, will be stimulated. 1915 
With appropriate planning and enabling policy, the transition of employment opportunities 1916 
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between high and low-carbon industries may yield positive consequences for both the 1917 
economy and human health. 1918 
This indicator tracks global direct employment in fossil fuel extraction industries (coal 1919 
mining and oil and gas exploration and production) and direct and indirect (supply chain) 1920 
employment in renewable energy, presented in figure 23. The data for this indicator are 1921 
sourced from the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) (renewables) and IBIS 1922 
World (fossil fuel extraction).104-106 1923 
 1924 
 1925 
Figure 23. Employment in Renewable Energy and Fossil Fuel Extraction Sectors. 1926 
 1927 
The number of direct and indirect jobs in the global renewable energy industry continues to 1928 
increase, reaching 10.3 million in 2017 (a 5.7% increase from 2016). Solar photovoltaic (PV) 1929 
overtook bioenergy to become the largest employer in 2016, and saw a further 9% growth 1930 
in 2017 (driven by China and India). Employment in biofuels increased for the first time since 1931 
2014 (a 12% increase in 2017 from 2016 levels), due to increased production of ethanol and 1932 
biodiesel (particularly in Brazil and the USA).106 1933 
 1934 
Bucking the trend of decreasing employment in the global fossil fuel extractive industries 1935 
(particularly in coal mining) established in 2011, driven by reducing prices, industry 1936 
consolidation and the rise in automation, employment rose by around 8% between 2016 1937 
and 2017.9 This rise is also driven by the coal mining sector, reflecting expansion due to a 1938 
double-digit price increase. However, it is likely that the decreasing trend will return, as the 1939 
low-carbon transition progresses.104 1940 
 1941 
The data for fossil fuel extraction employment for 2012-2016 differs significantly from that 1942 
presented in the 2017 Countdown report, due an improved methodology in the data 1943 
collection and estimation methodology for global coal mining employment by IBIS World. 1944 
Further detail on this indicator is in Appendix 5. 1945 
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Indicator 4.5: Funds divested from fossil fuels 1948 
Headline Finding: In 2017, the global value of funds committed to fossil fuel divestment was 1949 
$428 billion, of which health institutions accounted for $3.28 billion; this represents a 1950 
cumulative sum of $5.88 trillion, with health institutions accounting for $33.6 billion. 1951 
 1952 
Indicator 4.5 tracks the total global value of funds committed to divestment from fossil 1953 
fuels, and the value of funds committed to divestment by health institutions. This recent 1954 
and evolving movement seeks to both “remove the social license” of the fossil fuel industry 1955 
and guard against the risk of losses due to ‘stranded assets’ by encouraging institutions and 1956 
investors to commit to divest their assets invested in the industry. This approach is often 1957 
contrasted with an approach that sees investors actively engage with the fossil fuel industry, 1958 
for example by looking to mandate a reduction in high-carbon activities through 1959 
shareholder resolutions. These two approaches may not be mutually exclusive, and may be 1960 
most effective when employed in tandem.107 1961 
By the end of 2017, 826 organisations with cumulative assets worth at least $5.88 trillion, 1962 
including 17 health organisations with assets of around $33.6 billion, had committed to 1963 
divest, including the World Medical Association, Royal Australasian College of Physicians, 1964 
and the Canadian Medical Association.108 Between 2016 and 2017, the annual value of new 1965 
funds committing to divesting slowed from $1.24 trillion in 2016, to $428 billion in 2017. 1966 
However, health institutions have divested at an increased rate, moving from $2.4 billion in 1967 
2016 to $3.28 billion in 2017, with the American Public Health Association, the Hospital 1968 
Contributions Fund, and Medibank Australia as notable contributors. 1969 
In the context of this indicator, divestment is broadly defined, and includes organisations 1970 
that have committed to divest from one form of coal, through to those which have actively 1971 
divested from all fossil fuel industries. Ultimately, the Lancet Countdown aims to analyse 1972 
levels of divestment from different sectors. The methodology and data for this indicator has 1973 
not changed since the 2017 Lancet Countdown report; further details are available in 1974 
Appendix 5.108 1975 
 1976 
Indicator 4.6: Fossil fuel subsidies 1977 
Headline Finding: In 2016, fossil fuel consumption subsidies continued to follow the trend 1978 
established in 2013, decreasing to $267 billion – a 15% reduction on 2015 levels. 1979 
 1980 
Section 3 of this report makes some of the cardiopulmonary consequences of fossil fuel 1981 
combustion clear. Fossil fuel subsidies (both consumption and production) artificially lower 1982 
prices, promoting overconsumption, further exacerbating air pollution and its consequences 1983 
for human health. 1984 
 1985 
This indicator tracks the global value of fossil fuel consumption subsidies. Whilst these are 1986 
intended to moderate energy costs for low-income consumers, in practice, 65% of such 1987 
subsidies in LMICs benefit the wealthiest 40% of the population.109 Figure 24 demonstrates 1988 
a continuation of a downwards trend that began in 2013, with global fossil fuel consumption 1989 
subsidies reaching $267 billion in 2016.60 1990 
 1991 
 1992 
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 1993 
 1994 
Figure 24. Global Fossil Fuel and Electricity Consumption Subsidies – 2009-2016. 1995 
 1996 
Increasing fossil fuel prices tend to increase subsidy levels as the difference between the 1997 
market and regulated consumer price increases. For example, the doubling in oil price 1998 
between 2009 and 2012 was the principal driver behind the increase in subsidies in these 1999 
years. However, when fossil fuel prices reduce, the gap between market and regulated 2000 
prices also narrows, allowing governments to review the use of such subsidies while keeping 2001 
overall prices largely constant.60 2002 
Both factors were responsible for the declining trend experienced between 2012 and 2015, 2003 
continuing to be the case into 2016 with a further decrease in oil prices (to levels not seen 2004 
since 2002), and continuing subsidy reforms in the Middle East in particular.9,110 Although 2005 
the Middle East continues to provide around 30% of total subsidies, their value decreased 2006 
from around $120 billion in 2015 to $80 billion in 2016. As a result, subsidies to electricity 2007 
consumption in 2016 were – for the first time since such data was collected – larger than 2008 
those provided to oil consumption.60 2009 
The methodology and data source (IEA) for this indicator has not changed since the 2017 2010 
Lancet Countdown report, and is described there and in Appendix 5.9,60 However, the 2011 
breakdown by fuel for 2009-2013, which was previously not available, is now included. 2012 
 2013 
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Indicator 4.7: Coverage and strength of carbon pricing 2014 
Headline Finding: Carbon pricing instruments in early 2018 continue to cover the 13.1% of 2015 
global anthropogenic GHG emissions reached in 2017, but with average prices around 20% 2016 
higher than experienced in 2017. 2017 
 2018 
Adequately pricing carbon (both in terms of strength, coverage, and integration of varying 2019 
mechanisms) could potentially be the single-most important intervention in responding to 2020 
climate change. This indicator tracks the extent to which carbon pricing instruments are 2021 
applied around the world as a proportion of total GHG emissions, and the weighted average 2022 
carbon price instruments provide (table 2). The same methodology and data source (World 2023 
Bank Carbon Pricing Dashboard) were used for this indicator as the 2017 Lancet Countdown 2024 
report and is further detailed in Appendix 5.9,111 2025 
 2026 
 2027 
 2028 
Table 2. Carbon Pricing – Global Coverage and Weighted Average Prices per tCO2e. * Global 2029 
emissions coverage is based on 2012 total anthropogenic GHG emissions. 2030 
 2031 
The coverage of carbon pricing instruments remained at 13.1% of global anthropogenic GHG 2032 
emissions between 2017 and 2018, implemented through 42 national and 25 sub-national 2033 
instruments (see Appendix 5 for global map of carbon pricing instruments). 2034 
 2035 
The range of carbon prices across instruments remains vast (from <$1 /tCO2e in Poland and 2036 
Ukraine, to $139 /tCO2e in Sweden), although weighted-average prices in early 2018 were 2037 
20% above 2017 levels (both across instruments, and total global anthropogenic GHG 2038 
emissions). For example, the price under the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) (the largest 2039 
carbon pricing instrument in the world) rose by $10 /tCO2e between 1st December 2017 and 2040 
1st April 2018. 2041 
 2042 
With the addition of instruments currently scheduled for implementation, including the 2043 
Chinese national ETS (replacing the existing sub-national ‘pilots’), around 20% of global 2044 
anthropogenic GHG emissions will be subject to a carbon price.112 Further carbon pricing 2045 
instruments are under consideration in several other national and sub-national jurisdictions. 2046 
 2047 
 2048 
Indicator 4.8: Use of carbon pricing revenues 2049 
Headline Finding: Revenues from carbon pricing instruments increased 50% between 2016 2050 
and 2017, reaching $33 billion, with $14.5 billion allocated to further climate change 2051 
mitigation activities. 2052 
 2053 
 2016 2017 2018 
Global Emissions Coverage* 12.1% 13.1% 13.1% 
Weighted Average Carbon Price of 
Instruments (current prices, US$) 
$7.79 $9.28 $11.58 
Global Weighted Average Carbon 
Price (current prices, US$) 
$0.94 $1.22 $1.51 
Page | 64  
 
Indicator 4.8 tracks the total government revenue from carbon pricing instruments and how 2054 
such income is subsequently allocated. Government revenue from carbon pricing instruments 2055 
may be put to a range of uses. Revenue may be invested in climate change mitigation or 2056 
adaptation activities, be explicitly recycled for other purposes (such as enabling the reduction 2057 
of other taxes or levies), or simply contribute towards general government funds. 2058 
 2059 
 2060 
Government revenue generated from carbon pricing instruments in 2017 totalled nearly 2061 
$33 billion; a 50% increase from the $22 billion generated in 2016. This is driven by a 2062 
combination of increasing carbon pricing coverage in 2017 (with the introduction of the 2063 
Ontario ETS and carbon taxes in Alberta, Chile and Colombia), an increase in average prices, 2064 
and an increasing share of ETS permits bought at auction (rather than distributed for 2065 
free).112 2066 
 2067 
The absolute value of allocated funds has increased in all four categories, with the 2068 
proportional share remaining largely stable between 2016 and 2017. The most marked 2069 
change is a shift of approximately 4% of total revenue from ‘revenue recycling’ to 2070 
‘mitigation’ (see Appendix 5 for a description of the four categories). This is in part driven by 2071 
Colombia and particularly Ontario, committing to allocate all revenues from their newly-2072 
introduced instruments to further mitigation action. 2073 
Data on revenue generated are provided on the World Bank’s Carbon Pricing Dashboard, 2074 
with revenue allocation information obtained from various sources. Only instruments with 2075 
revenue estimates and with revenue received by the administering authority before 2076 
redistribution are considered. The methodology and principle data source (World Bank) for 2077 
this indicator has not changed since the 2017 Lancet Countdown report, and is described 2078 
there and in Appendix 5, along with further detail on the various sources used to obtain this 2079 
global picture of carbon pricing revenues, and data for individual instruments.9,111,112 2080 
 2081 
Conclusion 2082 
Section 4 has presented indicators on the costs of the broader impacts of climate change, 2083 
and the economics and finance that underpins climate mitigation. The results of these 2084 
indicators  suggest that the beginning of an economic transition towards a low-carbon 2085 
economy is underway, with many of the trends identified in the 2017 report continuing. 2086 
These trends can be interpreted as early signs of a broader transformation, with important 2087 
health benefits to follow, as a result of growing investment in low-carbon technology and 2088 
employment, a transition away from fossil fuels, and strengthened and expanded pricing of 2089 
GHG emissions. 2090 
However, the indicators presented here also make clear that meeting the Paris Agreement 2091 
will require significant further engagement from government, the private sector, and the 2092 
general public to increase the pace and scale of action. This broader engagement is 2093 
described in detail in the final section of the report. 2094 
 2095 
  2096 
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Section 5: Public and Political Engagement 2097 
 2098 
Introduction 2099 
As earlier sections make clear, “climate change is still moving much faster than we are” and 2100 
its negative impacts on human health continue to multiply.113 The impact (section 1) and 2101 
response (sections 2-4) sections of this report highlight the fact that action to date remains 2102 
insufficient to achieve the ambitions of the Paris Agreement.114 Public and political 2103 
engagement is central to increasing the speed and scale of action. 2104 
 2105 
Four domains of engagement are the focus of this final section: media, science, government 2106 
and corporate sector. Indicators have been identified for which annual and global data are 2107 
available. Trends are largely reported from 2007, the year before the 2008 World Health 2108 
Assembly where member states of the UN resolved to protect human health from climate 2109 
change.115   2110 
 2111 
The media play a central role in public understanding and perceptions of climate change.116 2112 
The public rely on the news media to communicate and interpret climate change science, as 2113 
well as to make sense of extreme weather events and assess actions by businesses and 2114 
governments.117,118 The first indicator enriches the methods deployed in 2017, providing a 2115 
global overview of media coverage of health and climate change from 62 newspapers, 2116 
which is then complemented with expanded in-depth analysis of three national newspapers: 2117 
the New York Times (US), Le Monde (France) and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2118 
(Germany).  2119 
 2120 
The second indicator focuses on science journals, the major source of evidence on health 2121 
and climate change for the public, policymakers and business sector. The third indicator 2122 
focuses on government engagement in health and climate change. Surveys point to 2123 
widespread public concern about climate change and its health-related risks, with most 2124 
people believing that their country has a responsibility to take action on climate change and 2125 
that their government is not doing enough.119-121 This indicator captures high-level 2126 
government engagement by tracking references to health and climate change in the 2127 
statements made by national governments at the annual United Nations General Debate 2128 
(UNGD) of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). The UNGD is a unique 2129 
international forum that provides all UN member states with the opportunity to address the 2130 
UNGA on issues they consider important.122  2131 
 2132 
The corporate sector is integral to the transition to a low-carbon economy, both through 2133 
their business practices and by influencing political responses to climate change.123,124 Data 2134 
for this new indicator comes from the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC), where 2135 
companies report annually on their progress on embedding environmental sustainability 2136 
and the SDGs into their business plans and activities.125,126 2137 
 2138 
 2139 
 2140 
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Indicator 5.1: Media coverage of health and climate change 2141 
Headline Finding: Coverage of health and climate change in the media increased 2142 
substantially between 2007 and 2017, a trend evident in both the global indicator and in-2143 
depth analysis of leading global newspapers. 2144 
 2145 
This indicator tracks coverage on health and climate change in the global media and 2146 
provides insight into the content of media coverage through analysis of selected leading 2147 
newspapers. 2148 
 2149 
Global media coverage of health and climate change increased by 42% between 2007 and 2150 
2017 (figure 25). This increase contrasts with global newspaper coverage of climate change 2151 
alone. While climate change coverage declined at an average rate of 1.25% per year, 2152 
coverage of health and climate change increased by an average of 4% per year. 2153 
There are marked regional differences, with more extensive media coverage in South East 2154 
Asia driving the global trend (figure 25). South East Asian coverage accounts for a large 2155 
proportion (42%-64%) of global coverage across the period. Moreover, the overall increase 2156 
in global coverage is driven by increased coverage in this WHO region, with the Times of 2157 
India, India’s largest English-language newspaper, contributing disproportionately to the 2158 
global total.127 English-language newspapers occupy a particularly central place in the Indian 2159 
media by communicating the perspectives and priorities of political and business 2160 
elites.128,129 2161 
 2162 
Figure 25. Newspaper reporting on health and climate change (for 62 newspapers), by WHO 2163 
region, 2007-2017  2164 
 2165 
Methods and data sources for this indicator are described in full, in the Lancet Countdown’s 2166 
2017 report and in Appendix 6.9 Analysis has been expanded significantly, from 24 2167 
newspapers in 2017, to 62 newspapers in 2018. 2168 
 2169 
The second component of Indicator 5.1 focuses on three major national newspapers that 2170 
form part of the ‘élite’ news media seen to play a pivotal role in shaping public and political 2171 
responses to climate change.130 Coverage of health and climate change increased in all three 2172 
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newspapers (figure 26). Between 2009 and 2017, the number of articles increased by 200% 2173 
in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), 133% in The New York Times (NYT) and 18% in Le 2174 
Monde. However, as figure 26 indicates, health remains marginal to wider climate change 2175 
coverage. Of the climate change articles published in 2017 in the NYT and in FAZ, only 2% 2176 
referred to health and climate change; in Le Monde, the proportion was slightly higher, at 2177 
8%. Media attention has been characterised by peaks linked to climate change action at the 2178 
global level, and to the UNFCCC COPs in particular.9 2179 
 2180 
Content analysis of the three newspapers points to marked national differences in coverage.  2181 
In the European newspapers, the proportion of articles explaining and justifying why climate 2182 
change is a public health issue declined over the period, with a parallel increase in those 2183 
highlighting the health dimensions of national climate change interventions. In contrast in 2184 
the NYT, most (92%) articles referring to both health and climate did so without linking 2185 
them; for example, they referred separately to US healthcare reforms (‘Obamacare’) and to 2186 
US disengagement from the Paris Agreement. Such articles are therefore not included 2187 
among those linking health and climate change in figure 26. In the European newspapers, 2188 
health and climate change are most frequently covered in the news sections; for example, 2189 
as an environmental issue (Le Monde) and an economic issue (FAZ). However, in the NYT, 2190 
health and climate change appear less frequently as news items and more frequently within 2191 
the Opinions section. The distinctive patterns of US media coverage of climate change have 2192 
also been noted elsewhere.131  2193 
 2194 
 2195 
Figure 26. Newspaper reporting of a) climate change, and b) health and climate change, in 2196 
the New York Times (NYT), Le Monde, and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ), from 2007-2197 
2017. 2198 
 2199 
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Methods and data sources are described in full in the 2017 Lancet Countdown report and in 2200 
Appendix 6.9 The analysis here has been enhanced both by the addition of a third national 2201 
newspaper (NYT) and by examining media engagement in health and climate change in the 2202 
context of wider coverage of climate change; further analyses are also presented in the 2203 
Appendix 6.  2204 
 2205 
 2206 
Indicator 5.2: Coverage of health and climate change in scientific journals 2207 
Headline Finding: Coverage of health and climate change increased by 182% in scientific 2208 
journals between 2007 and 2017.  2209 
Between 2007 and 2017, over 2,500 scientific articles examined the links between climate 2210 
change and health. Just under half (47%) presented new research. The remainder comprised 2211 
research-related articles (research reviews, editorials, comments, viewpoints etc.), with 2212 
research reviews making up the majority (55%) of these. The slight decline in scientific 2213 
output on health and climate change between 2016 and 2017 is the result of fewer 2214 
research-related publications (see Appendix 6 for figure showing these trends). 2215 
As in previous years, scientific interest in health and climate change in 2017 was focused on 2216 
America and Europe. Over a third (35%) of the papers concentrated on climate change and 2217 
health in America, with just under 30% of all papers concerned with North America only. A 2218 
further 25% focused on countries in Europe. Of the 20% of articles relating to the Western 2219 
Pacific region, half focussed solely on China. Less than 10% of papers related to health and 2220 
climate change in Africa (n=23) and South East Asia (n=18), a region that includes India and 2221 
Bangladesh. With respect to health outcomes, infectious diseases (particularly dengue fever 2222 
and other mosquito-borne diseases) were the most common health focus (24%). 2223 
 2224 
While this analysis points to increasing scientific engagement in health and climate change 2225 
over the last decade, the area is marginal to climate change science. Of the 43,000 articles 2226 
published in 2017 in the general area of climate change, only 4% made any link to health 2227 
and ˂1% (n=265) had a specific focus on health and climate change.  2228 
 2229 
 2230 
 2231 
Methods and data sources are explained in full, in the Lancet Countdown’s 2017 report, and 2232 
in Appendix 6.9 In addition to updating the analysis to include 2017, this year’s report also 2233 
explores the type of scientific output (research or research-related) and the volume of 2234 
outputs relating to climate change more broadly. 2235 
 2236 
 2237 
Indicator 5.3: Engagement in health and climate change in the United Nations 2238 
General Assembly 2239 
Headline Finding: From 2007 to 2017, national statements in the UN General Debate have 2240 
increasingly linked climate change and health.  2241 
 2242 
Figure 27 presents trends from 1970 to 2017, looking separately at references to health, to 2243 
climate change and to health and climate change. Whilst both health, and climate change, 2244 
have been central focuses of the UNGD for an extended period, joint references to health 2245 
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and climate change did not truly begin to rise until 2000. Since 2007, trends in engagement 2246 
in health and climate change have broadly matched the separate trends for climate change 2247 
and health. 2248 
 2249 
 2250 
 2251 
Figure 27. Proportion of countries referring to climate change, to health and to health and 2252 
climate change in the United Nations General Debates, 1970-2017. 2253 
 2254 
Two spikes in engagement are apparent. In 2009-10, 20% of countries referenced health 2255 
and climate change as linked issues, a spike associated with the build-up to the UNFCCC’s 2256 
COP15. The second, and larger, spike in 2014 coincided with the transition from the 2257 
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to the SDGs and the lead-up to the UNFCCC’s 2258 
COP21. In that year, almost a quarter of all governments referenced the health impacts of 2259 
climate change. Since 2014, there has been a decline in engagement with health and climate 2260 
change in the UNGD, with only 12% of the 196 UN member states referring to the two 2261 
issues together in 2017. In contrast, a significant majority referred to climate change (over 2262 
75%) in their 2017 UNGD statement. 2263 
There are marked global and national differences in the attention given to health and 2264 
climate change. Countries in the Western Pacific region are most likely to refer to climate 2265 
change-health links in their UNGD statements, with around 40% doing so in 2017. For 2266 
example, Tuvalu’s statement notes that, ‘the impacts of climate change pose the most 2267 
immediate, fundamental and far-reaching threat… to the right to the highest attainable 2268 
standard of physical and mental health’. The Australian statement discusses how the SDGs, 2269 
the Paris Agreement, and the Sendai Framework provide a blueprint for global action in 2270 
areas such as ‘climate change, diseases, including malaria, the management of our precious 2271 
resources…’. Cambodia also stated that ‘the 2030 Agenda is inextricably linked to many of 2272 
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the issues that perturb the world today, the most pressing being climate change, which is 2273 
not only a direct threat in itself but is also a multiplier of many other threats – from poverty, 2274 
diseases and food insecurity, to mass migrations and regional conflicts’.   2275 
Western Pacific regional engagement is driven by the Pacific Island states. In 2017, as in 2276 
previous years, the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) were prominent among the 2277 
countries referring to health and climate change in their UNGD addresses. Nauru, the 2278 
Maldives, the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu, St Kitts and Nevis, and Vanuatu all discussed climate 2279 
change-health links. In contrast, engagement was lowest in Europe and North America. 2280 
Methods and data sources are explained in full in the Lancet Countdown’s 2017 report, and 2281 
in Appendix 6.9 This year’s analysis reports on the proportion of countries referring to health 2282 
and climate change rather than the number of references; for continuity with the 2017 2283 
report, trends relating to the number of references are provided in the appendix, together 2284 
with additional analyses. 2285 
 2286 
 2287 
Indicator 5.4: Engagement in health and climate change in the corporate sector 2288 
Headline Finding: Engagement with health and climate change has remained limited among 2289 
companies within the UN Global Compact. 2290 
 2291 
This new indicator tracks engagement with health and climate change among the 12,000 2292 
companies signed up to the UNGC, the world’s largest corporate sustainability initiative.132 2293 
Established to address gaps in the global governance of corporations, it seeks ‘a more 2294 
sustainable and inclusive global economy’.133 Its ten principles relate to human rights, 2295 
working conditions and environmental responsibility. Companies report annually on their 2296 
implementation in Communication of Progress reports (CPs) that are made publicly 2297 
available. Our analysis focuses on 2011-2017 as very few CPs are publicly available before 2298 
2011 (Appendix 6).  2299 
 2300 
The proportion of companies referring separately and jointly to health and climate change 2301 
in their annual CPs indicates relatively high levels of engagement in health and in climate 2302 
change as separate issues: across the period, 55-60% of the reports engage with health and 2303 
around 45% with climate change. By contrast, less than one in seven reports refer conjointly 2304 
to health and climate change (Appendix 6 provides a figure of these trends). 2305 
 2306 
There are no spikes in engagement related to other UN initiatives, including the launch of 2307 
the SDGs, COP21 or the 2015 Paris Agreement. There are, however, marked differences in 2308 
engagement by corporate sector. Engagement is highest among telecommunication 2309 
companies, where over 40% of CPs made reference to the intersection of climate change 2310 
and health (Appendix 6).   2311 
 2312 
The UNGC has been subject to critique, including of its voluntary status, limited participant 2313 
base and inability to control the environmental externalities generated by the corporate 2314 
sector.134-136 Nonetheless, as a platform for developing and promoting sustainable policies 2315 
and practices, it represents the largest corporate citizenship programme to date.133  2316 
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The new indicator is based on the application of a key word search in the text corpus of CPs 2317 
submitted in English; in total, 48% (n=15,220) of CPs from 129 countries were analysed. 2318 
Climate change related terms were searched for the 25 words before and after a reference 2319 
to a public health-related term. Methods and data sources are explained in full in Appendix 2320 
6. Because companies are listed in one country, but often operate across multiple countries 2321 
both directly and via subsidiaries, analyses by the WHO region are not given here; however, 2322 
they can be found in Appendix 6. 2323 
 2324 
 2325 
Conclusion 2326 
Section 5 of this report has presented indicators of public and political engagement, which is 2327 
vital to transformational action on climate change. The barriers to action on health and 2328 
climate change are predominantly societal and not technical, with public and political 2329 
engagement therefore holding the key to accelerating the pace and scale of action.1 Three 2330 
conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of engagement in the media, science, UN and 2331 
corporate sector. 2332 
Firstly, engagement in health and climate change has increased in the media, science and 2333 
the UNGD over the last decade. The upward trend underlines the role of the UN, particularly 2334 
through the UNFCCC and its COPs, in mobilising engagement. For example, there are spikes 2335 
in the indicators around COP15 (2009) and COP21 (2015). Years that follow tend to see a 2336 
decline in engagement. The exception to this broad pattern is the corporate sector, where 2337 
evidence for companies within the UNGC points to little change in engagement in health 2338 
and climate change. 2339 
 2340 
Secondly, while overall engagement has increased over the last decade, it remains partial 2341 
and uneven. Rather than reflecting a process of global mobilisation, the upward trend is 2342 
being driven by individual regions and countries. The increase in global media attention is 2343 
the result of increased coverage by newspapers in South East Asia and by the Indian press in 2344 
particular. With respect to political engagement, it is SIDs that are using the global platform 2345 
of the UNGD to draw attention to the health impacts of climate change. Within the scientific 2346 
domain, overall trends again reflect uneven engagement. Here, however, increased 2347 
engagement has been driven by research focusing on health and climate change in high-2348 
income and high-emitting countries. By contrast, very few studies focus on Africa and South 2349 
East Asia, regions bearing the brunt of the health impacts of climate change.  2350 
Thirdly, while engagement in health and climate change has increased over the last year, it 2351 
represents a very small part of public and political engagement in climate change. Across 2352 
the media, science, government and the corporate sector, climate change is being framed in 2353 
ways that largely ignore its health dimensions. Thus, analyses of national newspapers and 2354 
scientific journals indicate that less than 5% of climate change coverage relates to health; 2355 
analysis of the inter-governmental forum of the UNGD suggests that climate change and 2356 
health are largely represented as separate issues, with much less attention given to them as 2357 
inter-connected phenomena. Similarly, a high proportion of companies within the UNGC 2358 
refer separately to health and climate change in their annual reports; however, only a small 2359 
minority make links between health and climate change. 2360 
 2361 
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Taken together, these conclusions point to increasing engagement in the health impacts of 2362 
climate change – and to the challenge of making health central to climate change action. 2363 
 2364 
  2365 
Page | 73  
 
Conclusion – the Lancet Countdown in 2018 2366 
 2367 
The Lancet Countdown: Tracking Progress on Health and Climate Change monitors progress 2368 
on the health and climate change along five domains: climate change impacts, exposures, 2369 
and vulnerabilities; adaptation planning and resilience for health; mitigation actions and 2370 
health co-benefits; economics and finance; and public and political engagement. The 2371 
collaboration is committed to an iterative and open process, and will continue to develop 2372 
the methods and data sources its indicators draw on, publishing annually in The Lancet 2373 
through to 2030. 2374 
 2375 
In 2018, many of the global trends previously identified accelerated – both in terms of the 2376 
health impacts of climate change, and the mitigation and adaptation interventions being 2377 
implemented around the world. The first section of the report made clear that vulnerable 2378 
populations are continually exposed to more severe climate hazards, with indicators 2379 
reporting 157 million heatwave exposure events for such groups in 2017, over 153 billion 2380 
hours of labour lost due to rising temperatures, and that climatic conditions are at their 2381 
most suitable for the transmission of dengue fever since 1950. Section 2 explored the 2382 
various ways in which ministries of health, cities, and health systems are planning to 2383 
enhance resilience and adaptation, providing more detailed insight into the quality and 2384 
comprehensiveness of these strategies, highlight the fact that only 3.8% of adaptation funds 2385 
available for development were allocated specifically for public health. Whilst there were 2386 
over 2.9 million premature deaths due to ambient pollution from PM2.5 globally in 2015, 2387 
promising trends in sections 3 and 4 demonstrated a continued phase-out of coal-fired 2388 
power, accelerated deployment of renewable energy, and continued divestment from fossil 2389 
fuels, which should help to reduce premature mortality from air pollution. Indicators in the 2390 
final section pointed to the same conclusions – that engagement in health and climate 2391 
change is increasing, enabling it to be an important driver of policy change globally. 2392 
 2393 
Four key messages emerge from the 41 indicators of the Lancet Countdown’s 2018 report: 2394 
 2395 
 Present day changes in labour capacity, vector-borne disease, and food security 2396 
provide early warning of compounded and overwhelming impacts expected if 2397 
temperature continues to rise. Trends in climate change impacts, exposures, and 2398 
vulnerabilities demonstrate an unacceptably high level of risk for the current and 2399 
future health of populations across the world. 2400 
 A lack of progress in reducing emissions and building adaptive capacity threatens 2401 
both human lives and the viability of the national health systems they depend on, 2402 
with the potential to disrupt core public health infrastructure and overwhelm health 2403 
services. 2404 
 Despite these delays, trends in a number of sectors are helping generate the 2405 
beginning of a low-carbon transition, and it is clear that the nature and scale of the 2406 
response to climate change will be the determining factor in shaping the health of 2407 
nations for centuries to come. 2408 
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 Ensuring a widespread understanding of climate change as a central public health 2409 
issue will be vital in delivering an accelerated response, with the health profession 2410 
beginning to rise to this challenge. 2411 
 2412 
Taken as a whole, the indicators and data presented in the Lancet Countdown’s 2018 report 2413 
provide great cause for concern, with the pace of climate change outweighing the urgency 2414 
of the response. Despite this, exciting trends in key areas for health, including the phase-out 2415 
of coal, the deployment of healthier, cleaner modes of transport, and health system 2416 
adaptation, giving justification for cautious optimism. 2417 
 2418 
Regardless, it is clear that how these indicators of impact and response progress up until 2419 
2030 will shape the health of nations for centuries to come. 2420 
  2421 
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